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Evaluating Vertical Mergers Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act*
By LAWRENCE P. POSTOL**

Mergers traditionally have been categorized as either horizontal,
vertical, or conglomerate.' While horizontal mergers are more suscep-

tible to governmental attack, 2 and conglomerate mergers are more
often the subject of law review articles, 3 vertical mergers are equally
deserving of attention. Vertical mergers do occur in our economy 4 and
are evaluated by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission. Moreover, they are controversial because economists and
government authorities do not agree on the anticompetitive nature of
* Copyright © Earl W Kintner, 1979. This Article is based on a chapter m Volume 3
of a treatise by Mr. Kintner entitled The Antitrust Laws ofthe UnitedStates, to be published
by the Anderson Publishing Co. m 1980.
** B.S., 1973, J.D., 1976, Cornell University.
1. This system of categorizing mergers has so permeated the antitrust laws that Justice
Department guidelines also have classified mergers as horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRESS RELEASE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), reprntedn [1977]
1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510 [hereinafter cited as MERGER GUIDELINES]. A fourth,
related form of business combination is the joint venture, which is a combination of two or
more companies in a business enterprise in which they are to share in the profits and losses.
In the leading case on joint ventures, the Supreme Court recogmzed that although the same
general policy considerations apply to both mergers and joint ventures, a joint venture is
inherently different from a merger- "This is not to say that thejomt venture is controlled by

the same criteria as the merger or conglomeration. The merger eliminates one of the participating corporations from the market while a joint venture creates a new competitive force
therein." United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170 (1964). For a more
detailed analysis ofjomt ventures, see Brodley, LegalStatus ofJoint Ventures under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 453 (1976).
2. In a 1977 speech, the then Assistant Attoi~ney General for the Antitrust Division
noted that from 1974 through 1976 the Department of Justice filed 18 merger cases, 16 of
which involved horizontal mergers. Address by Donald L Baker, Government Litigation
Under Section 7: The Old Merger Guidelines and the New Antitrust Majority (Feb. 24,
1977).
3. See, e.g., Bauer, Challengmg ConglomerateAergers Under Section 7 ofthe Clayton
Act: Today's Law and omorrow'sLegislation, 58 B.U.L. Rev. 199 (1978); Turner, Conglomerate Mergersand Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1313 (1965).
4. From 1967 to 1976, 7.5% of the large acquisitions in manufacturing and mining
were vertical mergers. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATISTICAL REPORT ON MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS 121 (1978).
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5
vertical mergers or the limits that should be placed on them.
This Article provides a detailed discussion of how vertical mergers
are evaluated under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 6 The Article first
describes the definition of a vertical merger, the business reasons for
such mergers, and the economic effects which result from vertical acquisitions. Next, the jurisdictional limits of the Clayton Act and other
relevant antitrust statutes are discussed, and a general framework for
evaluating vertical mergers, including the relevant markets, is
presented. Finally, the Article details the factors considered by courts
and government authorities in evaluating the legality of a vertical
merger.

Defining a Vertical Merger
A vertical merger is an acquisition 7 which combines two companies that operate in successive stages of the production or distribution
chain. 8 Use of the term "vertical" denotes "[e]conomic arrangements
between companies standing in a supplier-customer relationship" 9 and
differentiates a vertical merger from a horizontal merger, which combines direct competitors,' 0 and a conglomerate merger, which unites
firms that have no direct economic relationship." Thus, in a vertical
merger the merging firm in the earlier stage of the production/distribution chain sells products that the merging firm in the later
stage of the chain purchases. For example, the acquisition of an iron
ore mining company by a steel manufacturer would be classified as a
vertical merger because steel manufacturers purchase iron ore for the
5. Speech by Robert Pitofsky, FTC Commissioner, New Perceptions of New Directions at the Federal Trade Commission (Dec. 2, 1978).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
7. An acquisition, as opposed to other business relationships, is the assumption of
ownership and control by the acquiring firm of either the stock or assets of the acquired firm.
Clayton Act § 7 was amended in 1950 to cover asset acquisitions as well as stock acquisitions. See 2, 3 E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
AND RELATED STATUTES (1978) for a detailed discussion of the legislative history of Clayton
Act § 7.
8. In Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ill.
1965), the court defined vertical mergers as follows: "Vertical combinations ... join complementary facilities by integrating different stages in the production or distribution process." Id. at 317.
9. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
10. A horizontal merger is an acquisition prior to which the acquiring firm and the
acquired firm competed directly with each other in the same market. See Kintner & Postol,
A Review of the Law of HorizontalMergers, 66 GEO. L.J. 1405 (1978).
11. See Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 315, 318 & 318
n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
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production of steel.' 2 The combination of successive stages of the pro3
duction/distribution chain is characterized as vertical integration.'
Vertical mergers are classified into two categories, backward and
forward, depending on whether the acquiring firm reaches back and

acquires a firm engaged in an earlier stage of -the production/distribution chain or whether it reaches forward and acquires a
firm engaged in a later stage of the chain. If the acquiring firm
processes, assembles, or sells the raw material, component part, or

other factor of production supplied to it by the acquired firm, then the
merger is classified as a backward vertical merger. For example, a car
manufacturer's acquisition of a spark plug manufacturer is a backward
vertical merger. 14 If, however, the acquiring firm is the supplier and
the acquired firm processes, assembles, or sells that which is supplied to
it by the acquiring firm, then the merger is classified as a forward vertical merger. 15 In short, the acquisition of a supplier is a backward vertical merger and the acquisition of a customer is a forward vertical
merger.16

Business Reasons for a Vertical Merger
A company may enter into a vertical merger for a number of rea12. Vertical integration is in fact common in the United States steel industry: "All the
major steel firms in the United States are vertically integrated in that they mine and ship
iron ore, make pig iron, transform pig iron into steel, and produce a wide variety of finished
steel products." A. THOMPSON, ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM 295 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM]. See also Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production:
Market Failure Considerations,61 AMERICAN ECON. REv. 112 (1971), reprintedin 5 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST LAw & ECON. 323 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Williamson].
13. See Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 659
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 922 (1963) ("[a]s producer-fabricators these defendants are,
in the parlance of the economist, 'vertically integrated,' that is, they combine under one
main organization distinct business operations at more than one level").
14. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Sybron Corp., 329 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Pa. 1971), in which
a dental equipment manufacturer acquired a distributor of such equipment.
16. A merger can have both backward and forward vertical characteristics. In SmithVictor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. 11. 1965), Sylvania acquired a firm whose assets allegedly included research and marketing facilities which would
supplement those of Sylvania. Thus, the merger seemed at once a backward and forward
vertical merger.
Additionally, it should be noted that while the courts categorize the economic aspects of
a merger as either horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate, a merger may have more than one
dimension. For example, a merger may have both horizontal and vertical aspects. See
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Brown involved two companies
which manufactured and retailed their own brand of shoes, while also buying and selling
other brands of shoes. Thus, the Supreme Court had to analyze separately the horizontal
and vertical aspects of the merger. See text accompanying note 299 infra.
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sons. The major reasons 17 include (1) intra-industry familiarity
between firms in successive stages of the production/distribution chain;
(2) increased certainty over the availability of supplies and sales outlets; (3) protection and independence from oligopolistic firms at either
preceeding or successive stages of the production/distribution chain;
(4) economies of integration and cost spreading; and (5) elimination of
sales taxes and marketing costs.' 8 All of these reasons operate to make
vertical integration by merger an attractive expansion alternative for
firms.
The first reason, intra-industry familiarity, stems from the fact that
the management of any firm will be familiar with the industries at the
preceding and following stages of the production/distribution chain. A
firm obtains this familiarity both when it purchases its raw materials or
components from companies in the preceding stage and when it deals
with firms at the following stage of the production/distribution chain to
whom it sells its product for distribution or futher assembly. The firm
will have dealt with some, if not all, of the firms in both of these industries. This constant contact with adjacent industries, combined with
overlapping expertise, makes vertical mergers attractive to management.
For example, steel company executives deal with the management
of iron ore mining companies on a regular basis and are familiar with
the problems of mining iron ore because their own companies are directly affected by such problems. Thus, not surprisingly, many steel
producers have acquired iron ore mines. 19 Similarly, at the other end
of the production/distribution chain the building industry is a familiar
17. In addition to the advantages detailed here, the acquiring firm may also gain exposure to previously unavailable technical information, see, e.g., Filtrol Corp. v. Slick Corp.,
[1970] Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,035, at 88,054 (C.D. Cal. 1969), affd per curiam, 428 F.2d 826
(9th Cir. 1970), and may provide a "deep pocket." See notes 282-98 & accompanying text
infra.

18. The advantages of a vertical merger, as opposed to other types of mergers, only
exist because the business world differs from a perfect free model economy. In a perfect free
model economy, the familiarity between the firms would be unnecessary because everyone
would already have perfect information. Moreover, any economies which could be achieved
would have already been accomplished before the merger. There would not be any uncertainty of supply or sales. Therefore, a vertical merger would not be necessary to achieve
security. The vertical merger would only internalize the normal profit of the acquired firm
to the acquiring firm, which profit would be no larger than that of any other firm. Ours,
however, is an imperfect world and vertical mergers can generate many, and often substantial, savings. For a discussion of the classic free market model, see ECONOMICS OF THE
FIRM, supra note 12, at 341-66.
19. See note 12 supra.
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market to steel industry executives, and steel companies may wish to
enter the building market.
One of the major problems of many businesses is the uncertainty
of supplies and sales avenues. If a firm's supply of raw materials or key
component parts is cut off, the firm must curtail or possibly discontinue
production. Moreover, an increase in the price of such supplies can
reduce or eliminate a firm's profit margin. To the extent vertical mergers can alleviate these problems they become very attractive to management.
A backward vertical merger allows a firm to control its source of
supplies. By owning its supply company, the acquiring firm will have
easy access to information necessary to foresee labor disputes, rising
production costs, production breakdowns, and delays in scheduled deliveries. In many cases the acquiring firm will be able to control or
even eliminate many problems in the supply industry. In times of raw
material shortages, the acquiring firm will have the entire production of
the acquired firm to call upon for supplies. If monopolistic or oligopolistic suppliers attempt a price squeeze, the acquiring firm will be
protected against increasing prices of raw materials. 20 Finally, the acquiring firm can use the merger as an offensive weapon by keeping raw
materials out of rival hands 2or eliminating competitiors from the market through a price squeeze. '
A firm's outlets for selling its product are as important as its source
of supplies. In many industries, distributors will carry only one or two
brands of a product. Therefore, establishing and maintaining outlets
for one's product becomes a prime concern. An obvious solution to the
problem, adopted, for example, by major tire producers, 22 is to own
one's retail outlets.
Certainty of supplies and sales outlets is advantageous in any industry. In industries that have experienced wholesale vertical integration, however, such certainty may be necessary to prevent being
20. "[lit is not without design that heavy users of coal buy and operate coal mines, that
major steel firms have their own sources of iron ore, that major oil refiners maintain aggressive divisions to search out deposits of crude oil on the one hand and to sell their products
on the other hand, that Sears has a controlling interest in an appliance manufacturer, that
General Motors has its own divisions to supply it with batteries, shock absorbers, air conditioning units, and various other automobile parts, that A&P has a division to supply it with
bakery products and canned goods, and that Goodyear, Firestone, and B.F. Goodrich all
give special attention to maintaining an effective chain of retail stores including a number of
company-owned and operated outlets." ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM, supra note 12, at 297.
21.

F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 70

(1970). See notes 266-81 & accompanying text infra.
22. ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM, supra note 12, at 297.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

completely locked out of supply and sales outlets. Thus, in a market in
which firms have vertically integrated, the remaining firms may have to
follow suit merely as a defensive measure.
A firm may have to deal with oligopolistic firms in either the preceding stage or the following stage of the production/distribution
chain. These oligopolistic firms may have control over the relevant
sources of supplies or sales outlets and may be extracting abnormally
high profits. By acquiring such an oligopolistic firm, the acquiring firm
internalizes the high profit of the oligopolist and eliminates the possibility of being a victim of a price squeeze by the oligopolists. For example, a user of large amounts of gasoline might consider purchasing
its own fuel source and internalizing the oligopolistic profits the petro23
leum industry enjoys.
In addition to incentives based on the competitive environment of
the acquiring firm, a vertical merger may result in a reduction in overhead expenses per unit. Because a vertical merger combines firms in
successive stages of production or distribution, management may be
able to consolidate related tasks and spread overhead costs over the
combined stages of production. These savings are similar to savings
from economies of scale in horizontal mergers, the difference being that
the savings are produced from combining related rather than identical
functions. 24 Savings also can be generated from economies of integration, which are those savings that materialize when a firm owns multiple stages of production and thereby reduces the amount of effort
needed to move from one stage of production to another. Thermal
economy, for example, is attained through the integration of iron and
25
steel production.
Finally, vertical mergers may decrease taxes and marketing costs.
If a firm must pay a sales tax on its purchases of raw materials or component parts, a backward vertical merger will eliminate that expense
because ownership of the supplies remains the same. 26 Similarly, a forward vertical merger might allow a firm to reduce or eliminate its mar27
keting costs because it would be selling to itself.
23.

See Williamson, supra note 12.

24. For example, because a steel executive will be familiar with iron ore mining, he or
she may be able to assume managerial responsibilities for mining the ore. If the firms' businesses were unrelated, an additional executive would be needed to perform the task.
25. Williamson, supra note 12, at 121.
26. United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 603 (6th Cir. 1970).
27. See, e.g., Filtrol Corp. v. Slick Corp., [1970] Trade Cas. (CCH) 73, 035, at 88,054
(C.D. Cal. 1969), af'dper curiam, 428 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1970).
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Significantly, internal expansion,28 which is not censured by the
antitrust laws, and certain contractual relationships such as exclusive
dealing and requirement contracts, 29 can achieve the above noted benefits which vertical mergers provide.30 Internal expansion, however, requires large amounts of capital which many firms do not have, and
contractual relationships usually are less permanent and often difficult
and costly to enforce.31 Thus, many firms turn to vertical mergers.
Anticompetitive Effects of a Vertical Merger
Unlike horizontal mergers, which have certain inherent anticompetitive consequences, vertical mergers have no such inherent characteristics. 32 All vertical mergers, however, have the potential for

producing several anticompetitive effects. The first is the possibility of
the foreclosure of the "captive" capacity of the acquiring firm and the
acquired firm from the relevant market if the merged companies
choose to purchase and sell their products between each other exclusively. In addition, a vertical merger may produce a firm which is powerful enough to dominate one or both of the merging firms' markets.
Finally, a vertical merger may increase entry barriers or trigger a trend
of vertical mergers.
Foreclosure
A vertical merger combines a supplier and a customer. Because
the firms do not compete in the same market, no direct competition is
eliminated.3 3 Nonetheless, the supplier firm may decide to sell to its
28. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 568 (1972) (quoting district
court opinion in that case contrasting acquisition and internal expansion). The line between
acquisition and internal expansion is not always clear. In Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC,
454 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1972), the acquiring firm argued that it had acquired ready-mix
concrete companies prior to their construction of cement plants so that vertical integration
was achieved by internal expansion. The court rejected the argument, finding the mergers
part of an overall plan. Id. at 1088.
29. Courts have analogized vertical mergers to requirements contracts. See United
States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1288 (W.D. Pa. 1977); United Nuclear
Corp. v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
30. For a discussion of non-merger vertical integration techniques, some of which are
more anticompetitive than others, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,329-31
(1962).
31. Williamson, supra note 12, at 115. See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 332 n.55 (1962) (noting that "ownership integration is a more permanent and irreversible tie than is contract integration").
32. Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC [1979] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,733, at 78,129 (2d Cir.
1978).
33. In United Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539 (E.D. Pa.
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affiliated customer firm only and the customer firm may choose to
purchase its supplies only from its affiliated supplier. This internalization is most likely to occur if the merging firms actually dealt with each
other before the merger, although this is not always the case. 34 In either instance, other suppliers and customers in the market will be
"foreclosed" from competing for the merging firms' share of the relevant markets. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,35 the Supreme
Court described the problem of foreclosure:
The primary vice of a vertical merger or other arrangement tying a

customer to a supplier is that, by a foreclosing [sic] the competitors of
either party from a segment of the market otherwise open to them,
the arrangement may act as a "clog on competition,". 36. . which "deprive[s] . . . rivals of a fair opportunity to compete."

Although foreclosure is unquestionably anticompetitive, such foreclosure may not in fact occur after a merger. The merging firms may
decide that despite their affiliation they should deal with independent
firms, either to maintain separate profit centers, to retain supply avenues to meet excessive demand, or to dispose of excessive supplies.
Thus, while the potential for anticompetitive consequences from foreclosure always exists in a vertical merger, the effects may never materi37
alize.
1969), the Court noted that "'[viertical acquisitions seem to stand on a middle ground.
Generally speaking the anti-competitive consequences of a vertical merger appear more remote than those of a horizontal merger of substantial competitors, since the vertical merger
• . . does not per se increase the market position of merged companies in either of the two
markets involved.'" Id. at 555 (quoting Turner, ConglomerateMergers and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1321 (1965)).
34. E.g., Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 315, 317 (N.D.
Ill. 1965). The acquisition of a "potential customer" can result in foreclosure even though
the firms have had no prior dealings.
35. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
36. Id. at 323-24 (citations omitted).
37. FTC Commissioner Pitofsky seems to believe that anticompetitive consequences
from foreclosure are more theory than reality: "If competition is healthy and concentration
slight at both the supplying and distributing level, the elimination of a formerly independent
company by vertical merger may have no significant anticompetitive effect. If the acquired
firm is small - say less than 10% - and previous captive arrangements limited, there are
many other supply opportunities in the remaining 90% of the market. To the extent the
supplier does business only with its newly acquired outlets it may turn loose previous customers who have now become available to its own competitors. Moreover, competitors in
some markets may obtain access to the market by doing their own distributing or facilitating
the existence of new distributors (by offering reliable supply contracts or otherwise sharing
the risks of distribution with new distributors). Finally, the whole idea that an integrated
company will prefer its own subsidiary to outsiders, no matter how efficient the outsider or
inefficient the subsidiary, must be viewed with some caution. . . . Perhaps the real fear is
that equal captive products will be preferred in a vertically integrated operation - a legitimate antitrust concern but not quite the same problem as one prescribed by absolute foreclo-
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Competitive Advantages
A vertical merger also may be anticompetitive because the resulting firm dominates the supplying or purchasing market or because the
merger raises entry barriers. 3 8 The economic benefits which make vertical mergers attractive-certainty of supply and sales outlets, economies of integration, spreading overhead, combining expertise, and
other savings-may result in competitive advantages to the merging
firms in their respective markets. 39 These advantages in turn may allow the resulting firm to dominate the market and reduce competition
if other firms are unable to integrate vertically or otherwise compete
effectively. Moreover, the size of the resulting firm alone may act as a
barrier to entry by new firms.
In response to a vertical merger, the existing firms in the industry
may decide to merge to compete, and hence vertical integration may
become the industry standard. The increased capital requirement for
establishing a vertically integrated firm, as opposed to producing at a
single stage of production, would act as a substantial entry barrier.
If enough firms in the industry follow the initial vertical merger
their actions may trigger a merger trend which results in a locked-up
industry. Both the competitive advantages of a vertical merger and the
potential for being foreclosed from part of the market may lead other
firms to follow suit and vertically merge before they are locked out of
the entire market. The end result may be a totally vertically integrated
industry with no independent firms and, in turn, no competition.
Alternatively, if an oligopoly exists in one of the merging firm's
markets, then the merger, through the foreclosure effect, could imprint
the oligopoly upon the other merging firm's market by injecting an
oligopolist into the non-oligopolistic market. This too could result in
increased entry barriers. 40 In the same manner, a vertical merger also
may lessen the likelihood that deconcentration in an industry ever will
sure." Speech by Robert Pitofsky, FTC Commissioner, New Perception of New Directions
at the Federal Trade Commission (Dec. 2, 1978).
38. See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 579, 581 (3d Cir. 1962).
39. E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718, 728-29 (E.D.
Mo. 1964), af'dper curiam, 382 U.S. 12 (1965).
40. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 568 (1972); United States Nuclear
Corp. v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539, 555 (E.D. Pa. 1969). The same phenomenon can work in reverse. If the acquired firm's market is concentrated, oligopoly could
spread to the acquiring firm's market. See Filtrol Corp. v. Slick Corp., [1970] Trade Cas.
(CCH) 73, 035, at 88,053 (C.D. Cal. 1969), af'dper curiam, 428 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1970)
(vertical acquisition of supplier would give acquiring firm control of 80% to 90% of supply
market).
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41
take place.

Procompetitive Effects of a Vertical Merger
While these several anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers are
recognized by most economists, there is one school of thought which
views vertical mergers as procompetitive. Economists of this school
perceive vertical mergers as merely a production and supply chain redistribution which aids an industry's efficiency. 42 More traditional
economists also recognize these possible efficiencies of vertical mergers,
but feel that the anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers nevertheless
are real and must be considered. 43 The difference of opinion comes
about not in recognizing these efficiences, but rather in deciding
whether they outweigh the possible anticompetitive consequences.
This conflict about the overall impact of vertical mergers becomes critical when considered in light of the primary merger regulation statute,
section 7 of the Clayton Act, which is directed only at mergers that may
substantially lessen competition. Consequently, any vertical merger
found to have an overall procompetitive effect will be upheld.
The very factors which make a vertical merger advantageous from
a business viewpoint also may make the merger procompetitive. 44 If
the acquired firm was a weak competitor in its market, the strength it
41. The term "deconcentration" originated in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), a horizontal merger case: "[I]f concentration is already great, the

importance of preventing even slight increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration is correspondingly great." Id. at 365 n.42. Nonetheless,

judicial concern for preserving the possibility of future deconcentration may not be strong in
that it is rarely recognized by the courts. Occasionally, however, such a concern is expressed. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 578 (1972) (noting that the
relief granted would lower entry barriers to the sparkplug market, thus facilitating decon-

centration).
42.

Professor Bork summarized the views of economists who favor vertical mergers:

"What antitrust law perceives as vertical merger, and therefore as a suspect and probably
traumatic event, is merely an instance of replacing a market transaction with administrative
direction because the latter is believed to be a more efficient method of coordination ...
What is incipient in any. . . trend [toward vertical integration] is not the lessening of com-

petition but the attainment of new efficiency, and it is the latter result at which amended
Section 7 of the Clayton Act is actually striking in vertical merger cases.
"It is thoroughly naive of the law to suppose that vertical merger affects resource alloca-

tion adversely while vertical growth affects it not all. The only difference between vertical
merger and vertical growth is that in a specific situation at a particular moment one or the
other will be the lower-cost way of achieving the efficiencies of integration." R. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 227 (1978).
43.

F.

SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

87-88 (1970).
44.

See notes 18-31 & accompanying text supra.

70,
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gains from the merger may make it a stronger competitor and increase
competition in that industry. The merger may bring revitalized management to the acquired firm. Savings from economies of integration
and spreading overhead may make the acquired firm more competitive
in its non-captive production. In addition, capital from the acquiring
firm may allow for needed improvements to increase efficiency or expand production.
The possibility of creating a strong competitor with a guaranteed
minimum production (the captive capacity) is especially important if
the acquired firm is in an oligopolistic market in which competition is
moderate or nonexistent and potential entrants are dissuaded from entering the market by the market power of the entrenched firms. A vertical merger in which a small member of such an oligopolistic industry
is acquired can stimulate competition because the acquired firm,
through the advantages of vertical integration, may gain the ability to
compete effectively against the larger industry members. In addition,
retaliation by the larger firms will be less of a threat because of the
protection offered by the captured production of the acquired firm.
Moreover, the vertical merger may awaken the entrenched members of
the industry to the fact that other vertical merger opportunities exist
and thus force those entrenched members to compete for fear that those
opportunities will draw other stronger competitors into the market.
Although vertical mergers can be upheld as being procompetitive,
the courts have not looked favorably upon allegations that a vertical
merger enhances competition, even in oligopolistic markets. In Ford
Motor Co. v. UnitedStates,45 Ford acquired Autolite, a sparkplug manufacturer, and argued that because the merger would enable Autolite to
compete against the larger sparkplug manufacturers it was procompetitive and should be upheld. The Court examined the allegation that the
merger would increase competition in the oligopolistic sparkplug market in which "there were only two major independent producers and
only two significant purchasers of original equipment sparkplugs" prior
to the merger.46 The Court, however, found that the merger did not
stimulate competition, but "aggravated an already oligopolistic market." 47
45. 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
46. Id. at 570.
47. Id. However, it should be noted that the Court confused Ford's countervailing
power argument with the economic benefit defense rejected in United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), and thus rejected Ford's argument on the basis of Philadelphia. See notes 331-33 & accompanying text infra for a discussion of the countervailing
power defense. See notes 334-36 for a discussion of the significance of economic benefits in
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Similarly, in MississppiRiver Corp. v. FTC,48 the acquiring firm
argued that covert de facto integration of the cement market had made
market entry impossible except by merger and that its merger therefore
was procompetitive. The acquiring firm maintained that the prevention of entry by acquisition would "insulate an entrenched oligopoly."' 4 9 The court, however, adopted the FTC's determination that the
merger was anticompetitive and refused to "ignore possible increases in
' '50
concentration [just] because the market may already be oligopolistic.
While Ford and Mississippi River do not reject, and indeed could
not reject, the mandate of section 7 that only anticompetitive mergers
are illegal, they do demonstrate a reluctance by the courts to find that a
vertical merger is in fact procompetitive. Thus, even in oligopolistic
markets, strong evidence must be presented in support of a vertical
merger if it is to be upheld as procompetitive. Notably, however, some
commentators disagree with the position the courts have taken in attempting to "protect" competition. These writers feel that the courts
and the Justice Department have gone too far in trying to protect small
firms and argue that although a small firm may be injured, the merger
may be procompetitive if it increases the efficiency of the industry. 5 1

Applicability and Jurisdictional Limits of Section 7 and Other
Relevant Statutes
Vertical mergers may be attacked under a variety of federal statutes, including the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Federal Trade
Commission Act, as well as by state attorneys general in a variety of
evaluating mergers. The economic benefits defense has been rejected as a defense to vertical
mergers as well as horizontal mergers. See, e.g., Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231
F. Supp. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), arf'dper curiam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 615-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).

48.

454 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1972).

49.

Id. at 1088.

50. Id. at 1089.
51. "Too few people understand that it is the essential mechanism of competition and
its prime virtue that more efficient firms take business away from the less efficient. Some
businesses will shrink and some will disappear. Competition is an evolutionary process.
Evolution requires the extinction of some species as well as the survival of others. The

business equivalents of the dodoes, the dinosaurs, and the great ground sloths are in for a
bad time-and they should be. It is fortunate for all of us that there was no Federal Biological Commission around when the first small furry mammals appeared and began eating
dinosaur eggs. The commission would undoubtedly have perceived a 'competitive advantage,' labeled it an 'unfair method of evolution,' and stopped the whole process right there."
Bork & Bowman, The Crises in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 375 (1965).
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ways.52 The primary weapon of those opposing vertical mergers, however, is section 7 of the Clayton Act which, as originally passed in 1914,
provided:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of
another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of
such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between
the corporation whose stock is so acquiredandthe corporationmaking

the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or com53
munity, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
The language emphasized here originally was thought to limit the applicability of section 7 to horizontal mergers. In 1950, however, Congress amended section 7, explicitly including asset acquisitions within
its scope and eliminating the language which was thought to restrict the
section to horizontal mergers. For mergers consummated before 1950,
however, the old language of section 7 is still applicable.
Because of the limiting language in the original'section 7, the government did not challenge a vertical merger under section 754 until
United States v. E.1 du Pont de Nemours & CO. 55 In that case the
Supreme Court held that, even as originally enacted, section 7 applied
to vertical mergers.5 6 The Court, after examining the legislative history
of section 7, found that the emphasized language of section 7 specified
only one of three prohibitions contained in section 7 and that mergers
which might "restrain commerce" or "tend to create a monopoly" were
also prohibited. The Court held that these prohibitions could and did
apply to all types of mergers, 57 stating that the purpose of the 1950
amendment to section 7 was merely "'to make it clear that [it] applies
52. See notes 92-99 & accompanying text infra.
53. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976)) (emphasis added).
54. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590 (1957)
(citing FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQuIsITIONS 168 (1955); H. R. Doc. No. 169, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); and quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949), in support of the statement that in the previous 35
years the government had not used § 7 on vertical mergers).
55. 353 U.S. 586 (1957). Although the decision was rendered in 1957, the merger occurred before 1950 and the case was filed in 1949.
56. Id. at 590-92.
57. Id. But see Justice Burton's dissent in which he points out that § 7 does not necessarily apply to vertical acquisitions, noting that even these two aspects of § 7 could be applied to horizontal acquisitions only: "Corporations engaged in the same business activity in
different areas do not necessarily 'compete ... [but] their combination might result in a
restraint of commerce or a tendency toward monopoly violative of § 7." Id. at 617-18 (Burton, J., dissenting). Justice Burton also found legislative history contradicting the majority's
view of the legislative history. Id. at 611-19.
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to all types of mergrs and acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as
well as horizontal ... "58
The holding of du Pont was endorsed in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States.5 9 The Court in Brown initially noted that section 7 as originally
passed did appear to be confined to acquisitions that "would result in a
substantial lessening of competition between the acquiringand acquired
companies .... -60 In a footnote, however, the Court accepted the
holding in the du Pont case that "such a construction of § 7 was incorrect." 6 1 The Court held that Congress,
by the deletion of the "acquiring-acquired" language in the original
text ...

hoped to make plain that § 7 applied not only to mergers

between actual competitors, but also to vertical and conglomerate
mergers whose effect may tend to lessen62competition in any line of
commerce in any section of the country.
The courts thus have held that section 7 of the Clayton Act generally is applicable to vertical mergers. There are, however, essentially
five statutory jurisdictional prerequisites to its invocation. The section
cannot be applied to a business combination when: (1) either of the
merging companies is not a corporation; 63 (2) either of the corporations
is not engaged in interstate commerce; 64 (3) the transaction that led to
58. Id. at 590 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949)) (emphasis
by the Court).
59. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). For a prior vertical acquisition case involving amended § 7,
see United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affdper curiam,
365 U.S. 567 (1961).
60. 370 U.S. at 312 (emphasis in original).
61. Id. at 313 n.21.
62. Id. at 317 (footnotes omitted). See also International Rys. of Cent. America v.
United Brands Co., 405 F. Supp. 884, 898-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), ai'd,532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439,
460 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (directed at acquisitions by corporations).
64. See United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 275-76
(1975) ("under the explicit reach of § 7 . ..not only must the acquiring corporation 'be
engaged in commerce,' but the corporation or corporations whose stocks or assets are acquired must be 'engaged also in commerce' "); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S.
186 (1974) (jurisdictional limits of Clayton Act, which reach only those corporations engaged in commerce, are not as far reaching as the limits of Sherman Act, which requires
only an effect on commerce).
Under § 7 a merger between an American and a foreign corporation, or even a merger
between two foreign corporations, can be challenged provided both firms are "engaged in
commerce" in the United States. United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp.
129, 138 (N.D. Cal.), afldper curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966) (Canadian corporation engages in
commerce via its "control of, the close business relationship with and assistance to," California corporation). See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS 5 (1977), reprintedin [1977] 799 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-I,
E-5 (corporation must be "engaged in production, distribution, or acquisition of goods or
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the combination is not an acquisition; 65 (4) the transaction that led to
the combination did not involve stock or assets; 66 or (5)the transaction
is exempt from application of section 7.67 Challenging those mergers
that fall outside the scope of these limits requires invoking other antitrust statutes. These statutes, sections 1 through 3 of the Sherman
Act,68 section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 69 and various

provisions of state antitrust laws,70 generally have narrower standards
for judging mergers than the Clayton Act and thus normally are inyoked only when a business combination is outside the Act's jurisdictional limits. Therefore, the applicability of these other antitrust
services in commerce" among the states or between the United States and a foreign country).
Several cases have suggested that the Department of Justice and the FTC take the position
that the same standards used under § 7 of the Clayton Act for domestic mergers-that the
acquisition will substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly-also apply to
foreign mergers. See, e.g., United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19,
39 (D. Conn. 1970); United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129, 144
(N.D. Cal.), a.F'dpercuriam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966); Litton Indus., Inc., 82 F.T.C. 793, 969-70
(1973), modofed, 85 F.T.C. 333 (1975); Dresser Indus., Inc., 63 F.T.C. 250, 298 (1963). Perhaps courts in evaluating mergers involving foreign corporations should consider the special
barriers to entry that foreign corporations face, such as language and cultural differences
and statutory restrictions.
Legislation recently has been proposed to amend § 7 of the Clayton Act to expand its
jurisdictional limits to corporations "incommerce or [engaged in] any activity effecting commerce." H.R. REP. No. 6001, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1977).
65. Compare United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 181-83
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (grant of exclusive license for 14 years constitutes an acquisiton) with
Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 F. Supp. 362, 374-76 (N.D. Ga.
1975), afd, 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1976) (loan guarantor's right of first refusal for purchase
of stock held not an acquisition of that stock).
66. The courts, however, have broadly defined "stock" and "assets." See, e.g., United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 344 n.22 (1963) (any transaction that is
"tantamount in its effects to a merger," including other kinds of corporate amalgamations, is
governed by § 7); United States v. Chelsea Say. Bank, 300 F. Supp. 721, 723-24 (D. Conn.
1969) (quoting Philadelphia);United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153,
181-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (grant of exclusive license for 14 years constitutes acquisition of
asset under § 7).
67. Section 7 exempts stock acquisitions "solely for investment" and also permits the
formation of subsidiary corporations to aid in conducting a corporation's business. Of
course, neither of these permitted activities may substantially lessen competition. 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1976). It is difficult to demonstrate that the sole purpose for the acquisition was investment. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 563 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
Section 7 also does not apply to transactions consummated pursuant to authority given by
specifically named administrative agencies. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976). The important provisions of the Sherman Act for these
purposes are § 1 and § 2. Section 3 applies §§ 1 and 2 to the District of Columbia and to the
territories.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
70. See note 92 & accompanying text infra.
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statutes is discussed prior to considering the operation of the Clayton
Act.
The Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in part that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal ....
The traditional view is that the Sherman Act standard requiring an actual restraint of competition is harder
to meet than the Clayton Act's "incipiency" standard, which requires
only a tendency to substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly.72 There have been, however, few merger cases brought under the
Sherman Act and its standard for judging mergers is not certain.
The early cases under the Sherman Act seemed to hold that all
mergers which involved large firms are illegal. 73 Subsequently, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.74 formulated a
different standard for judging mergers under the Sherman Act by concluding that mergers under section 1 of the Sherman Act must be judged by that Act's traditional "rule of reason," thereby prohibiting only
unreasonable mergers. Although a later Supreme Court opinion suggested that this standard might be easier to satisfy than the Clayton Act
standard, 75 subsequent cases have confirmed that the Clayton Act stan76
dard is less difficult to satisfy than the Sherman Act rule of reason.
Nonetheless, section 1 of the Sherman Act can be used in situations in
"71

71.
72.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328-29 (1962)("tests for

measuring the legality of any particular economic arrangement under the Clayton Act are
. . . less stringent than those used in applying the Sherman Act"). See also Crown
Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 814-15 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937
(1962); Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177, 183 (E.D. Mich. 1960), a'dper

curiam, 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp.
576, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152
F. Supp. 387, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).

73.

See, e.g., United States v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922); United States v.

Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912);
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
74. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).

75. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665, 669-70 (1964) (Sherman Act standard finding violation in elimination of a significant amount of competition
between merging companies appears to be broader than Clayton Act standard). One lower
court has followed this reading of First National Bank. United States v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States

v. Tidewater Marine Serv., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 324, 343 n.16 (E.D. La. 1968).

November 1979]

VERTICAL MERGERS

77
which the Clayton Act is inapplicable.

Section 2 of the Sherman Act, like section 1, may be used to attack

mergers outside the jurisdictional limits of the Clayton Act. Because
the focus of this section differs in most respects from that of section 7 of
the Clayton Act, there has been little confusion concerning the difference in their standards. 78 Section 2 provides in part that "[e]very per-

son who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .

.

.

.

79

Thus, a merger80

violates section 2 only if it results in a monopoly or constitutes an attempt or conspiracy to monopolize the market. 8' Consequently, to
have a merger condemned under this standard is more difficult than

under the Clayton Act incipiency standard.
The Federal Trade Commission Act

Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), which
like the Clayton Act adopts an incipiency standard, provides in part

that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful."8 2 The logical extension of the statute is that any

merger that results in unfair competition is unlawful under section 5.
Nevertheless, the statute does not delineate clearly how this standard of
83
unfair competition compares with the standard of the Clayton Act.

77. For example, the Sherman Act, but not the Clayton Act, would apply to mergers
where one or both of the merging companies are not corporations or are not engaged in
interstate commerce, a transaction leading to a combination that is not an acquisition or
does not involve "stock" or "assets," or a transaction exempt from the application of § 7.
78. See, e.g., Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 780, 794
(S.D. Tex. 1971), aft'd, 476 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1973) (unlawful intent requisite for proving § 2
violation, unlike Clayton Act violation).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
80. A series of mergers also may be attacked. In United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp.,
187 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1960), a.ff'dper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), the government
attacked a series of mergers under both § 7 of the Clayton Act and §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act.
81. In judging mergers under § 2 of the Sherman Act the courts have used traditional
standards employed in other monopolization cases. See United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911). See

also E. KINTNER,

AN ANTrrRUST PRIMER

101-09 (1973) (summary of pertinent standards

under § 2 of the Sherman Act).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1) (1976).
83. For a detailed, but somewhat outdated, analysis of section 5 of the FTC Act, see
Howrey, Utilization by the FTC of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as an
AlnirustLaw, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 161 (1960).
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In applying the FTC Act to mergers, however, the Federal Trade
Commision has assumed that the jurisdictional application of section 5
is broader than that of the Clayton Act. For example, in BeatriceFoods
Co. 84 the Commission held that the FTC Act could be used to attack
noncorporate acquisitions even though the Clayton Act is inapplicable
to such transactions. 85 In Dean Foods Co. 86 the Commission went further in extending the FTC Act by holding that section 5 could be used
against an acquired corporation. 87 Dicta in Commission opinions suggests that the Commission is apt to go even further. For example, in
ForemostDairies,Inc.88 the Commission stated in dicta that it had the
power to scrutinize the cumulative effect of a series of acquisitions
under section 5 even if none of them individually could be shown to
have the adverse effect required by the Clayton Act, a position the
Commission noted again, in dicta, in Beatrice Foods Co. 89 In addition,
in 1975, Congress amended section 5 to expand its jurisdictional scope
from the "in commerce" test used in Clayton Act cases to "in and affecting commerce." 90 How far the Commission will go in applying the
FTC Act is uncertain. At some point courts inevitably will limit the
Commission's power to determine what is "unfair competition." 9'
State Statutes, Parens Patriae, and Class Actions
In addition to the federal laws, there are many state statutes that
can be used to condemn mergers, particularly purely intrastate transactions outside the reach of the federal antitrust laws. 92 Furthermore,
states, through their respective attorneys general, can take advantage of
84.
85.

67 F.T.C. 473 (1965), modiedby consent, 71 F.T.C. 79 (1967).
67 F.T.C. at 726. The Commission concluded that § 5 reaches transactions that

violate the standards of the Clayton Act, even though for technical reasons they are not
subject to the Act, unless such application would be an attempt to supply what "Congress

has studiously omitted." 71 F.T.C. at 81.
86. 70 F.T.C. 1146 (1966), modfied, 71 F.T.C. 731 (1967).
87. 70 F.T.C. at 1290-91.
88. 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962), modified, 67 F.T.C. 282 (1965).
89. 67 F.T.C. 473, 726-27 (1965), modliied by consent, 71 F.T.C. 731 (1967).
90. Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 201, 88 Stat. 2183-2203 (1975) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976)). The "in and affecting" standard has been held to be
broader than the "in commerce" standard. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance
Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 276-81 (1975).
91. Although courts give great weight to the Federal Trade Commission's determina-

tion that a practice is unfair or deceptive, the Supreme Court has made clear that ultimately
"it is for the courts to determine what practices or methods of competition are to be deemed
" FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934) (citing FTC v. Gratz,
unfair ..
253 U.S. 421 (1920)).
92. These statutes vary considerably in their treatment of mergers and consequently a

discussion of their various provisions is beyond the scope of this Article. For a collection of
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federal laws by bringing either class actions or parenspatriae suits.
States can and have filed class suits on behalf of consumers in the state
when the state also has suffered from the violation and hence can act as
a named representative of the class.93 Finally, states long have been
permitted to bring separate actions for damages suffered by the state
4
itself 9
Parenspatriaeactions for antitrust claims, on the other hand, were
limited to injunctive relief 95 and used sparingly until the passage of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 which
amended section 4 of the Clayton Act 96 to make parenspatriaeactions
generally the most effective state antitrust enforcement weapon. The
Act authorizes state attorneys general to represent natural persons residing in their states in suits for money damages suffered because of
trade practices violating the Sherman Act.97 The action is, in form,

similar to a class action brought under the antitrust laws requiring published notice of the litigation.98 The Act's parenspatriae provision,
however, is limited to Sherman Act violations and therefore cannot be
used to attack a merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act. A state,
however, may maintain a common law parenspatriae action outside
the scope of the statute if the state is acting in its capacity as a consumer, rather than in its role as representative of its citizens. 99
With these means of challenging antitrust violations, state attorneys general have the ability to invoke federal antitrust law on behalf
of the state and in some circumstances its consumers. These remedies
under federal law complement those available under state law and give
the states substantial power to enjoin or receive damages for mergers
that have anticompetitive effects within their boundaries.
these state statutes, see AMERiCAN BAR AssocIATioN ANTITRUST SECTION, STATE ANTI-

TRUST LAWS (1974).
93. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert denied,404 U.S. 871 (1971).
94. See Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942) (state is a "person" within the meaning
of § 7 of the Sherman Act, entitled to treble damages).
95. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); California v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
96. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 301, 90 Stat. 1394 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 15c (1976)). For a detailed discussion of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act see Kintner, Griffin & Goldston, The Hart-Scoti-RodinoAntitrust Improvements Act of
1976"-An
Analysis, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1977).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1976).
98. Id. § lSc(b)(1).
99. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-63 & n.14 (1972); Georgia v. Hiram
W. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942); see Florida v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied,429 U.S. 829 (1976).
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Framework for Evaluating Vertical Mergers
Any analytical framework for evaluating the legality of mergers
must focus on section 7 of the Clayton Act, which provides that no firm
shall acquire all or part of another company if "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a
monopoly."' 0 0 This broad language makes certain concepts equally
applicable to all types of mergers. Thus, in applying section 7 to all
types of mergers, including vertical mergers, the courts have recognized
the congressional purpose of "arresting mergers at a time when the
trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its
incipiency."' 0 1 To meet this standard the government need only show
aprobable anticompetitive effect and may use evidence relating to any
time in the future.' 0 2 Despite the broad application of section 7, however, the factors used in evaluating vertical mergers differ from those
considered in examining horizontal and conglomerate mergers, because
of the different economic consequences of each type of merger.
As with all mergers, the first step in evaluating vertical mergers is
identifying the "area of effective competition,"'' 0 3 which is accomplished by determining the relevant product and geographic markets.
Although market definition may not be as critical for vertical merger
evaluation as it is for evaluating a horizontal merger because of the
lack of direct competition, it can significantly affect the extent of potential and actual foreclosure found by a reviewing court. Naturally, the
smaller the relevant market, the greater the percentage of foreclosure
and the larger the apparent anticompetitive effect. Market definition
therefore can have substantial impact on vertical merger evaluation by
the courts.'04
100. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
101. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962).
102. Id. at 323.
103. The phrase originated in a Clayton Act § 3 case, Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949). It has been repeated in § 7 vertical merger cases. Eg., Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962); United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957). See also Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
104. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957)
(substantiality determined only in terms of market affected); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v.
United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249, 1282 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (determination of
relevant product and geographic markets initial step in finding Clayton Act violation in
vertical acquisition).
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Product Market

The relevant product market is the group of products or services
that are sold or can be sold by the merging "selling" firm to the merging "buying" firm. The courts seek to determine how many firms sell
these products or services, how many firms purchase them, and in what
quantity. The merger's effect thus is evaluated in both the supplier's
market and the customer's market. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States,10 5 the first major case under section 7 as amended in 1950, the
Supreme Court provided the basic procedure for delineating the prod-

uct market. The Court stated that "[t]he outer boundaries of a product
market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or
the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes
for it."106 This definition refers to the physical characteristics and the

price interaction between the products in question. The Court indi07
cated, however, that neither factor was determinative.1

Recognizing that the Clayton Act prohibits mergers that may
lessen competition "in any line of commerce,"' 0 8 the Court in Brown

Shoe further held that within a product market there can be relevant
submarkets.' 0 9 The boundaries of a submarket may be determined by

examining such practical indicia as: (1) industry or public recognition;
(2) a product's peculiar characteristics and uses; (3) unique production

facilities; (4) distinct customers; (5) distinct prices; (6) sensitivity to
price changes; and (7) specialized vendors." 0 The Court made clear,
however, that the existence or nonexistence of any one factor was not
105. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
106. Id. at 325. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606, 617 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
107. 370 U.S. at 326. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 453, 455
(1964); United States v. Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606, 615 (C.D. Cal. 1967), a'dper
cur/am, 390 U.S. 712 (1968); United States v. Lever Bros., 216 F. Supp. 887, 889-91
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). Cost differentials, however, can be determinative if they make one product
uncompetitive for some uses. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271,
275-76 (1964) (copper uneconomical as overhead conductor compared with aluminum and
therefore not included in market).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (emphasis added).
109. 370 U.S. at 325. Submarkets were considered in United States v. Sybron Corp., 329
F. Supp. 919, 921 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (dental equipment and dental sundries submarkets of
dental products market); United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 452-53
(N.D. Cal. 1967) (printing and fine paper, coarse paper, and sanitary paper submarkets of
paper market); United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 98-100 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), a9dpercuriam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965) (paper insulated power cable submarket of insulated power cable market); Filtrol Corp. v. Slick Corp., [1970] Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,035, at
88,054 (C.D. Cal. 1969), af'dper curiam, 428 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1970) (margarine and hard
butters submarket of fatty oil and fats market).
110. 370 U.S. at 325.
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determinative. I1'
Although Brown Shoe provides the starting point for determining
the relevant product market, later cases have added more refined concepts. In United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank 1 2 the Supreme
Court held that a cluster of services or products can constitute a relevant product market if they are " 'sufficiently inclusive to be meaningful in terms of trade realities.' "1113 In United States v. Continental Can
Co., 114 the Court held that just as there can be a narrow submarket
within a market, there also can be a broad inter-industry market that
includes more than one product market. 1 5 Furthermore, competition
need not exist for all uses of the product; competition for some uses is
6
sufficient. 1
While these various concepts are used to determine the relevant
product market in all merger cases, two problems in defining that market are characteristic of vertical merger cases. First, the issue arises
whether the market should include all producers of the relevant product-independent and captive-or only independent producers. The
second issue in measuring the product market is whether the market
should include only actual producers of the relevant product or both
present and potential producers, i e., those who have the capacity to
produce the relevant product but presently are using that capacity to
produce another product.
In evaluating the first issue, the courts have split on whether or not
the foreclosure brought by the merger should be computed as a percentage of the entire industry production (captive and independent) or
as a percentage of the industry production that has not already been
foreclosed through either merger or internal integration (independent).
Some courts have adopted the position that the captive production
should be excluded from the market definition. For example, in United
States v. Blue Bell, Inc. ,117 the court excluded from the market definition rental garment manufacturers which were affiliated with laundries
8
who purchased the manufacturers' supplies."I
At least one court has taken the opposite position and refused to
111. Id.at 327.
112. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
113. Id. at 356-57 (quoting Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 811 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962)).
114. 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
115. Id.at 456-57.

116.

Id. at 457.

117.

395 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).

118.

Id. at 543.
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exclude captive production from the relevant market. In International
Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone & Electronics
Corp. 19 the court ruled that the telephone equipment market should
include captive production:
[I]t is clear that the Supreme Court did not intend the Brown Shoe
concept to be used to exclude, in all cases, consideration of purchases
by integrated "captive" customers of an appropriately defined line of
products. In Brown Shoe itself, the Court computed market share by
including manufacturers' sales to captive customers ... despite the
fact that opportunities for "independent" sales to such retailers were
on the decline ....
not
[I]t follows only that vertical foreclosure in itself does
120
justify defining a customer market to exclude "captive" sales.
The court's reliance on Brown Shoe, however, may have been misplaced, because in Brown Shoe no shoe retailer ever sold its integrated
manufacturer's brand exclusively. Consequently, there actually was no
exclusive captive production to be excluded from the relevant product
market.
The second issue raised when defining the relevant product market
in a vertical merger, including or excluding potential producers, is discussed under the rubric of the "production flexibility" or "convertible
capacity" doctrine. Under that doctrine, the relevant market includes
not only all the producers of the goods that the acquired firm and its
competitors produce, but also all the producers who could produce
those goods in thefuture. Similarly, in determining the dimensions of
the merger, consideration is given not only to the products the merging
firms produce, but also to the products they could produce.
The production flexibility market definition was accepted in a
Sherman Act case, United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 12 1 when the
evidence suggested that rolled steel producers could make other rolled
22
products interchangeably. In UnitedStates v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,'
however, the court, in examining a vertical merger under the Clayton
Act, rejected the production flexibility doctrine because the evidence
showed that the producers actually did not shift from product to product quickly and the buyers could not shift their purchases at all. The
court therefore concluded that the potential production of the firms was
immaterial. 23 Although the court in Bethlehem Steel rejected the ap119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
13 (9th

518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 930-31.
334 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1948).
168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Id. at 592, 592 n.34. See also Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 812Cir. 1961).
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plication of the production flexibility doctrine, the Supreme Court in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States12 4 gave the doctrine new life, stating
that the theory merely was inapplicable to the facts before the Court at
that time. Justice Harlan argued in a separate opinion for a product
market based on the doctrine, although he nonetheless reached the
same result as the majority on the legality of the merger. 25 While the
production flexibility doctrine is still viable in theory, the fact remains
that to date no court has applied it when evaluating a vertical merger
under section 7.126
Geographic Market
As noted previously, under section 7 of the Clayton Act a merger
is judged by its competitive consequences in the relevant geographic
market or submarket. 27 In the case of a vertical acquisition "it is particularly appropriate that the inquiry evolve around 'the geographic
structure of the supplier-customer relations.' 2128In Brown Shoe, also
the leading case on defining relevant geographic markets, the Court
observed that the process was similar to that of defining the product
market.12 9 The Court, however, did not utilize concepts such as interchangeability or cross-elasticity of demand to delineate the geographic
market. Rather, the Court determined that a pragmatic, factual approach to the definition was necessary. 30 The Court concluded that
the geographic market selected must both" 'correspond to the commer31
cial realities' of the industry and be economically significant.'
124.
125.
States v.
126.

370 U.S. 294, 325 n.42 (1962).
Id. at 366-67 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see United
Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 285 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Although product markets have not been enlarged by production flexibility, they

have been narrowed by production inflexibility. See, e.g., United States v Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 454 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (special machinery required); United States v.
Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), afdpercuriam,381 U.S. 414

(1965) (special machines and special engineering know-how required).
127. See notes 103-04 & accompanying text supra.
128. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 455 (N.D. Cal. 1967)
(quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963)).
129. 370 U.S. at 336. Occasionally, determination of the relevant product market and of

the geographic market depend on the same criterion. In Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC,
291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961), the court held that both the product market and geographic
market were limited by transportation costs. 1d. at 281-83. Moreover, like product markets,
geographic markets can have submarkets. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,

336 (1962).
130. 370 U.S. at 336.
131. Id. at 336-37 (quoting American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,
152 F. Supp. 387, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), a/J'd,259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958)). A major factor in
determining the commercial realities will be transportation costs or the lack thereof. See,
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In United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank132 the Supreme
Court gave somewhat more detailed guidance, noting that the geographic market is where "the effect of the merger on competition will
be direct and immediate." 133 The Court went on to conclude that "the
'area of effective competition in the known line of commerce must be
charted by careful selection of the market area in which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies
1"134

The courts thus have a great deal of latitude in defining the geographic market depending on how they view the commercial realities
and the practical habits of purchase. Given this latitude in establishing
the relevant geographic market, the courts usually have focused on the
supplier-customer relationship between the merging firms and on
where the merger will affect other supplier and customer firms. 3
Once the market is defined, however, the inquiry shifts to the potential
for anticompetitive impact.
Legal Standards for Judging Vertical Mergers
In evaluating the effect of vertical mergers, the courts have focused
on aspects of the merger which are peculiar to the customer-supplier
relationship, such as foreclosure. As the courts have noted, however,
there is no per se prohibition against vertical integration 36 or vertical
merger.' 37 Rather, an examination of the merger's overall competitive
effect is necessary.' 38 In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 3 9 the
Supreme Court set forth the basic guidelines for evaluating vertical
mergers. As capsulized in later cases, 4° the standard for determining
e.g., United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1278 (W.D. Pa. 1977);
International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1174 (D.
Hawaii 1972), rev'd inpart on othergrounds, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
132. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
133. Id. at 357. See also United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 45455 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
134. 374 U.S. at 359 (quoting Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327
(1961)) (emphasis by the Court). Accord, Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083,
1090 (8th Cir. 1972); United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 596 (6th Cir. 1970).
135. See note 134 supra.
136. Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 662 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963).
137. Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1088 (8th Cir. 1972).
138. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324-25 (1962) (vertical acquisition
is to be examined as to its adverse effect on competition).
139. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
140. United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1970); Mississippi
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whether a vertical merger transgresses section 7 consists essentially of
six factors:
(1) [F]oreclosing of the competitors of either party from a segment of
the market otherwise open to them; (2) the "nature and purpose" of
the vertical arrangement; (3) actual and reasonable likely adverse effects upon local industries and small businesses; (4) the level and
trend of concentration in the market shares of participating companies, including any trend towards domination by a few leaders; (5)
the existence of a trend towards vertical integration and consolidation in previously independent industries; and (6) the ease with
to full entry
which potential entrants may readily overcome barriers
4
and compete effectively with existing companies.' '
While these factors are the most significant in judging vertical mergers,
any factor that reflects the competitive impact of a vertical merger will
be considered by the courts. To clarify the meaning and application of
these concepts as construed by the courts an expanded discussion of
each standard is warranted.
Foreclosure
As noted earlier, the term foreclosure refers to the exclusion of
competitors from the trade between a supplier firm and a customer firm
which may arise if the two firms merge.142 The magnitude of the potential foreclosure effect of a vertical merger is directly proportional to
the market shares of the merging firms. The greater the market shares,
the larger the anticompetitive effect. Similarly, the concentration level
in the merging firms' markets is relevant to the determination of the
anticompetitive consequences. The more concentrated the market, the
more important it is to prevent foreclosure of the independent section
of the market. Thus, like horizontal mergers, the anticompetitive effect
of a vertical merger is reflected in part by the market shares of the
43
merging firms and the concentration in their respective markets.
The foreclosure effect, as noted earlier, can be either actual, potential, or both,144 and can result in either partial or complete foreclosure
River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1091 (8th Cir. 1972). These cases cite to two cases in
addition to Brown Shoe: FTC v. Consolidated Foods, 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v.
Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), af'dper curiam, 381 U.S. 414
(1965).
141. United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1970).
142. See notes 33-37 & accompanying text supra.
143. Some commentators, however, have questioned the significance of market shares in
evaluating vertical mergers. Comanor, Vertical Mergers, Market Powers and the Antitrust
Laws, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 254 (1967), reprintedin5 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST LAW & ECON.

309 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Comanor].
144. The argument that no actual foreclosure is likely to take place has been made by
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of the relevant markets. 145 There is always, of course, the threat that
partial foreclosure will become total foreclosure as the merging firms
adjust their needs and supply capabilities. Because the foreclosure ef-

fect is initially only potential, courts look to the merging firms' intent to
determine if, and to what extent, foreclosure in fact will occur.
One indication that foreclosure is likely to occur is the intention of

the acquiring firm to secure for itself a source of supply or an outlet for
sales. 146 Even if the acquiring firm's intent is not clear, courts often will
extrapolate from the acquiring firm's past behavior, reasoning that the
acquiring firm probably will continue any past practice of integrating
newly-acquired subsidiaries into its operations.

47

Section 7 of the Clayton Act does not require, of course, that the

merger under consideration evidence actual or complete anticompetitive consequences. Rather, an acquisition is illegal if the effect of such

acquisition "may be substantially to lessen competition."''

48

Thus, fore-

closure, whether actual or potential, and whether partial or total, can

be sufficient to condemn a merger if the overall effect is to substantially
lessen competition.

49

Whether the merger substantiallylessens compe-

tition, however, will be determined in part by whether the foreclosure is
potential or actual and by the size of the market shares foreclosed: "If
the share of the market foreclosed is so large that it approaches monopoly proportions, the Clayton Act will, of course, have been violated
several plaintiffs, sometimes successfully. E.g., Scott Paper Co. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 579, 582
(3d Cir. 1962) (remanded on other grounds); United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F.
Supp. 1271, 1285 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (argument successful); United States v. Sybron Corp., 329
F. Supp. 919, 928-31 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (argument unsuccessful on the weight of the evidence).
145. For example, General Motors purchased fabrics and finishes in significant quantities from du Pont's competitors even though du Pont had acquired 23% of General Motors'
stock. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 630-43 (1957) (Burton,
J., dissenting). See notes 19-24 & accompanying text supra.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 98 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), af dper curiam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965). Kennecott's expressed purpose in expanding in
fabrication "was to assure a future market for the sale of its copper." Of course, the absence
of such an expressed intent is not determinative. Anticompetitive intent is not a prerequisite
to a finding of illegality. See note 218 & accompanying text infra. Intent is, however, one of
the factors considered in evaluating vertical mergers, especially upon considering the anticipated foreclosure effect. See notes 144-45 & accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
the significance of intent in evaluating vertical mergers, see notes 213-25 & accompanying
text infra.
147. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 332 (1962) (past behavior of
acquiring firm indicated purpose violative of Clayton Act).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (emphasis added). See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
149. See Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1091 (8th Cir. 1972).
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Vertical mergers presenting the largest 15' or second larg. . ,.5o
est 52 single possible foreclosure in the industry are suspect. However,
"foreclosure of a de minimis share of the market will not tend 'substantially to lessen competition.' ,'153 In between these extremes, there is
much less certainty.
In assessing the foreclosure effect of a vertical merger, a court initially must determine which market share statistics are relevant. The
statistics which the court utilizes will depend on which stage of the customer-supplier relationship the court is examining. In the supplier
market, the court will look at the percentage of the total industry supply that is sold by the merging supplier firm. 154 Similarly, in the customer market, the court will look closely at the percentage of total
55 Of
industry purchases that the merging customer firm controls.
course, the court must always examine both the supplier and customer
markets. 15 6 If the merger is anticompetitive in either market, then it
must be condemned. For example, in UnitedStates v. Sybron Corp.,157
the court condemned the vertical merger of a firm manufacturing 24%
of the dental equipment in the United States with a firm that held 8% of
the retail market. The court condemned the merger even though it
concluded that the merger was not anticompetitive in the dental submarket in which the manufacturer had only 4.3% of the sundries manufacturing submarket and the retailer had 7.5% of the retail
submarket. '58
The courts vary as to what market share they consider to be sus150. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328 (1962). See also United States
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 462 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
151. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 331-32 (1962); United States
Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 600 (6th Cir. 1970). Cf GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co.,
463 F.2d 752, 754 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 413 U.S. 901 (1973) (complaint dismissed

for lack of injury).
152.

Cf Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 1972) (one of

acquired firms was one of two largest manufacturers in Memphis).
153.
154.

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962).
See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 568 (1972) (acquisition of

a spark plug manufacturer by car manufacturer which consumed 10% of all spark plugs
manufactured).
155. See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539, 555
(E.D. Pa. 1969).
156. The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines provides: "With all vertical mergers
it is necessary to consider the probable competitive consequences of the merger in both the

market in which the supplying firm sells and the market in which the purchasing firm sells,
although a significant adverse effect in either market will ordinarily result in a challenge by
the Department." MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, 11.
157.
158.

329 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
Id. at 931.
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pect for vertical acquisitions. Expressed in terms of the market shares
of purchases or sales, the foreclosure effect of vertical mergers has been
held to be substantially anticompetitive when one of the merging firms
15 9
had a market share as little as 9.8%, 2%, 160 and approximately 1%. 161
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,162 the Supreme Court condemned

a merger which foreclosed only 1.5% of one of the relative submarkets,
baby shoes. Noting Brown Shoe, one lower court held a vertical
merger to be unlawful even though under one conceivable market defi-

nition the merger resulted in a foreclosure of only 1.3% to 3.7% of the
market.

63

Some commentators, however, have criticized the Supreme

Court's analysis of market share statistics in Brown Shoe. These writers
contend that a correct reading of the statistics reveals that little or none

of the market actually was foreclosed.) 64
Notably, some courts, when considering the foreclosure effect, refer to the industry rank of the merging firms as opposed to market
share statistics. Industry rank, of course, reflects the market share of
the merging firms as well as the concentration in the industry.1 65 In
addition, in some cases the courts have utilized the total capacity of the
merging firms in measuring market shares, as opposed to the present
166
production of the merging firms.

159. United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 600 (6th Cir. 1970).
160. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1967), notedin
United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 600 n.18 (6th Cir. 1970).
161. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966), notedin United
States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 600 n.18 (6th Cir. 1970).
162. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
163. Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1091 (8th Cir. 1972).
164. Bork & Bowman, The Cr/sis in Antitrust, 65 COLtrM. L. REv. 363, 371 (1965).
Professors Bork and Bowman contend that the Kinney-Brown Shoe merger foreclosed little
or none of the market. They point out that at the time of the merger Kinney acquired none
of its merchandise from Brown Shoe and that two years later only acquired 7.9%. They note
that Kinney supplied 20% of its own retail requirements and, therefore, Brown Shoe,
through the merger, stood to foreclose a maximum of less than 1%of the nation's retail shoe
sales and in reality had foreclosed only less than 1/10th of 1%. Id. at 372.
165. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1962); Mississippi River
Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1086-87 (8th Cir. 1972); United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426
F.2d 592, 593-94 (6th Cir. 1970).
166. Some courts have noted the disparity between a firm's capacity and its actual production. Most courts have relied on actual production figures and have only discussed the
firm's capacity in passing. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S.
271, 278 (1964); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 503, 505 (1948); Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 253 F. Supp. 196, 227 (D.N.J. 1966); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F.
Supp. 576, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Courts also occasionally distinguish between market share
statistics measured by quantity sold. See, e.g., A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585,
628 (3d Cir. 1962).
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In most cases then, a vertical merger apparently may be condemned even though the market share foreclosed is quite low. The Department of Justice has stated in its Merger Guidelines that it ordinarily
will challenge a vertical merger if the supplier firm controls 10% or
more of its market and the customer firm controls 6% or more of its
market.167 Interestingly, the market share statistics that the guidelines
utilize are higher than those found to be illegal in Brown Shoe. Accordingly, some commentators have noted that enforcement authorities
have loosened the market share standards and68 that vertical mergers
with low market shares are no longer suspect.1
In addition to examining the market share statistics of the merging
firms to assess the magnitude of the foreclosure effect, courts consider
whether the merging firms' markets already have experienced significant foreclosure from prior mergers or internal expansion. 169 A low
level of vertical integration in an industry tends to exculpate a vertical
merger, while a high level tends to condemn it.170 Similarly, if the ac167. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, 12. See United States v. Hammermill Paper
Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1280-81 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (courts pay guidelines some deference, but
they do not have the force of law and are not binding).
168. Speech by Robert Pitofsky, FTC Commissioner, New Perceptions of New Directions at the Federal Trade Commission (Dec. 2, 1978) (noting decline in enforcement actions
against vertical mergers with low market shares). Commissioner Pitofsky in his speech concluded that "ordinarily vertical mergers involving market shares of the dimension in Brown
Shoe (or indeed at the percentage levels indicated in the Department of Justice guidelines)
are challenged rarely today. In short, the law appears to have eased for the best of reasons
- because under careful analysis, formerly perceived anticompetitive effects have come to
be viewed as somewhat exaggerated." However, Donald I. Baker, while Assistant Attorney
General of the Antitrust Division, was not willing to assume that the guidelines effected a
loosening of the market share standard for vertical mergers: "I, myself, have not yet had a
hard vertical case putting the issue to me, and I am not prepared to say that the vertical
merger guidelines are too strict until I can test those guidelines against the facts of an actual
case." Address by Donald I. Baker, Government Litigation under Section 7: The Old
Merger Guidelines and the New Antitrust Majority (Feb. 24, 1977). See, e.g., Fruehauf
Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1979) (approving foreclosure of 5.8%).
169. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 (1962) (significant aspect of
consolidation is whether industry has experienced easy access to markets by suppliers and
buyers, or has witnessed foreclosure); United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 600
n. 19 (6th Cir. 1970) (market clogged at time of acquisition by prior vertical foreclosure).
Foreclosure can occur not only from vertical mergers, but also when firms which are
already integrated from previous mergers internalize more of their sales and purchases. See
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 332 (1962); United States v. Kennecott
Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'dper curlam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965).
Foreclosure also can be the product of customer preference. For example, if mechanical
parts are habitually replaced with the same brand as that installed originally, the competitors of the original equipment sellers are effectively foreclosed from that portion of the replacement sales market. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
170. See NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir.
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quiring company itself has made acquisitions in the past and plans to
make more in the future, a court will be more suspicious of the merger
in question. 71 This is especially true if the parent firm's avowed policy
in the past has been to absorb its subsidiaries' production 72 or if the
level of foreclosure endangers the survival of independents.
The merging firms, however, can attempt to rebut any inference of

anticompetitive consequences arising from their market shares by demonstrating that they do not wield market power in proportion to their

market shares and that accordingly any foreclosure effect will be
slight. 173 For example, in UnitedStates v. Sybron Corp.,17 4 the merging

customer firm argued that the anticipated foreclosure would never occur because customers preferred goods other than those of its captured
supplier and thus as a customer firm it would profit by carrying a full
line for resale. The court, however, did not accept the argument as
applied to the circumstances of the case before it. 175 In FordMotorCo.
v. United States,17 6 the customer firm argued that its market share
should be discounted because a portion of the partially-acquired firm's
manufacturing capacity would continue to be independently utilized,

and because the number of competitors in the market actually increased because of the merger. While the court accepted this argument,
1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477 (1977); United Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539, 556
(E.D. Pa. 1969).
171. See United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 563 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aj'dpercuriam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). In Jerroldthe acquiring firm was enjoined from further merger activity without the government's approval because of its proclivity for acquisition. Id. at 575.
172. See note 169 supra.
173. See United Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539, 555-56
(E.D. Pa. 1969). In United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271 (W.D. Pa.
1977), the court recited many facts which tended to exculpate a merger. The court concluded that the probability of actual foreclosure was insufficient to condemn the merger
because of the pre-acquisition volume of sales, government contract business, the necessity
to market a wider range of products than Hammermill manufactured, the increase in direct
sales in the industry, operation of the acquired firms as independent profit centers, and the
fact that the Department of Justice had consented to larger combinations in the industry in
the past. On the other hand, courts are not persuaded by evidence which does not controvert
market share statistics, but which merely attempts to demonstrate that competitors do not
expect the foreclosure from the merger in question to do any harm. See United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196, 227 (D.N.J. 1966); Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454
F.2d 1083, 1091 (8th Cir. 1972) (conflicting testimony).
174. 329 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
175. The court felt that the proponent did not successfully "[sever] the traditionally accepted relationship of market share to market power." However, the court found that customer preferences eventually would dissipate. Id. at 928-29.
176. 405 U.S. 562 (1972).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

it was not enough to validate the merger. 177
Although theoretical arguments concerning the anticipated foreclosure effect are considered by courts, tangible proof of the actual effects is much more persuasive. If post-acquisition evidence of
foreclosure is available, a court may give great weight to it. An actual
increase in sales from the merged supplier firm to the merged customer
firm after an acquisition is highly probative, because the increase must
be at competitors' expense unless the increase is attributable to economic growth.17 8 Such post-acquisition evidence is persuasive because
the anticompetitive consequences are no longer likely, but have occurred and can be evaluated by the courts. 179 Indeed, one court condemned a merger when the percentage of a captured outlet's needs for
one item met by the acquiring manufacturer rose from 2.6% to 11.6%
after the merger. 180 Other courts have proscribed mergers where postacquisition evidence revealed that the respective merging customer firm
purchased 7 1%, "substantially all," and "virtually all" of their requirements from the merging supplier firm after the merger, whereas before
the merger they purchased only 52.4%,181 53.8%,182 and none, 183 respectively. In these cases, the courts concluded that the mergers in fact had
harmed competitors. 184 Similarly, post-acquisition evidence of competitors selling out to the integrated firm in despair, 8 5 or otherwise leaving
the market, 8 6 will be interpreted as demonstrating and confirming suspected trends of vertical mergers and the anticompetitive nature of the
merger. On the other hand, courts give little weight to post-acquisition
evidence that the anticipated foreclosure did not occur after the merger,
177. Id. at 570.
178. See United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 446, 464 (N.D. Cal.
1967). See also United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 595, 601 (6th Cir. 1970).
179. See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Of
course, any explainable increase in sales between the merging firms will not be held to condemn the merger. See United States v Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1291
(W.D. Pa. 1977) (increase not out of line with acquiring firm's increased sales to other outlets
or with increased purchases made by the acquired outlets from other suppliers).
180.
181.

United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 444-46 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606, 613 (C.D. Cal.

1972).
182. United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 1970).
183. United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 96, 98, 104 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), affid per curiam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965) (no purchases in 1958 prior to November 24,
1958 merger).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 446, 460 (N.D.
Cal. 1967).
185. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 603-04 (1957).
186. See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 1970).
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187
reasoning that the evidence may be contrived by self-restraint.
Despite the primary importance of the foreclosure effect, the Justice Department-in its guidelines and the courts in their decisions have
emphasized that foreclosure analysis alone is not determinative:
[I]n cases ... in which the foreclosure is neither of monopoly nor de
minimis proportions, the percentage of the market foreclosed by the
vertical arrangement cannot itself be decisive. In such cases, it becomes necessary to undertake an examination of various economic
and historical factors in order to determine whether the arrangement
under review is of the type Congress sought to proscribe.' 8 8
The courts and the Justice Department, in evaluating vertical mergers,
also consider entry barriers, existing trends toward vertical integration,
the absence of vertical economies, and the presence of unwarranted
competitive advantages. The foreclosure effect alone therefore cannot
be considered to be determinative in evaluating the legality of a vertical
89

merger.1

Trend Toward Vertical Integrationand Protection of Independents

A trend toward vertical integration in the relevant market may be
caused by a variety of business practices. The firms may be vertically
integrating through internal expansion, 190 acquisition, 19 or fuller utili187. United States v. Sybron Corp., 329 F. Supp. 919, 927 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (post-acquisition evidence indicating a decline in dealings between the merged firms does not establish
the legality of the merger). See also Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368, 1378
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,439 U.S. 982 (1978) (post-acquisition evidence "entitled to only
'extremely limited' weight").
188. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962) (footnote omitted). See
United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1281 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (market
share foreclosure starting point of analysis, but not determinative). See also MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 1.
189. United States v. Sybron Corp., 329 F. Supp. 919, 931 (E.D. Pa. 1971). In NBO
Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1975), vacatedand
remandedsub noma. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), the
Third Circuit reversed a district court judge whose instructions to the jury placed too much
emphasis on the size of the market share foreclosed and not enough weight on competitive
advantage, concentration, and other nonquantitative factors. In United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1286, 1292 (W.D. Pa. 1977), the importance of foreclosure
(in the 4%to 5%range) was lessened by the dissipation of the trend toward vertical integration and by the low entry barriers.
190. See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1970). It is
interesting to note that competitive urges expressed through internal integration also can
harm competition: "Parodoxically competition can also be lessened through the process of
competition itself. The few big copper producers may be able to achieve the same result
through internal expansion. This route is not forbidden by the Clayton Act, however. Presumably Congress felt that this route was inherently more justifiable. It is also more difficult
to achieve and more difficult to prevent." United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F.
Supp. 95, 104 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aj'dpercur/am, 381 U.S. 414 (1965).
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zation of supplier or customer firms previously acquired. 192 Whatever
the cause, if such a trend exists or may occur in the relevant market,
then any merger which may cause or add to the trend will be considered suspect. 193
A trend toward vertical integration may start because several firms
in the market become aware of the advantages of vertical integration,
e.g., vertical economies and secure supply sources or outlets. 194 Aggressive firms may want to be the first to capitalize on these competitive
advantages, while more cautious firms may then follow suit to avoid
being placed at a "growing competitive disadvantage"'' 95 or, if the
handicap is severe enough, to avoid being threatened with extinction. 196 Even though such defensive mergers are merely a response to
an existing trend they are still suspect, as courts disfavor vertical mergers made pursuant to "deliberate policies"' 197 or which are part of a
continued "chain reaction."19 8
The primary reason for scrutinizing any trend toward vertical integration is that an industry exhibiting such a trend will become increasingly noncompetitive to the detriment of nonintegrated firms. 199 The
integrated firms then may monopolize their shares of the market leaving a smaller, shrinking portion in which independent firms may com2 °° and outlets20 1 will
pete. The" number of independent suppliers
191.

See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 301 (1962).

192. Id. at 301 (recognizing "definite trend" for parent-manufacturers to supply an everincreasing percentage of retail outlets' needs).
193. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 603 (6th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196, 226 (D.N.J. 1966).
194. See notes 18-31 & accompanying text supra.
195. United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 602 (6th Cir. 1970). "Competitive
disadvantage" can result from the pricing flexibility possessed by integrated firms. Id. at
603.
196. See id. at 603 n.25.
197. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 332 (1962).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 447 (N.D. Cal.
1967); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Cf.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 279 n.6 (1964) (reactive vertical
acquisitions listed in a primarily horizontal merger case). This problem has been especially
significant in the cement industry. See Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1092
(8th Cir. 1972); United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 602 (6th Cir. 1970). For a
discussion of the motivation for vertical acquisition in the cement industry see Liebeler,
Toward a Consumer's Antitrust Law. The Federal Trade Commission and VerticalMergers in
the Cement Industry, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1153, 1156-60 (1968).

199.
200.
201.
1967).

See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 602 (6th Cir. 1970).
See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196, 226 (D.N.J. 1966).
See United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 447 (N.D. Cal.
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decline as more and more firms seek to assure themselves of supply
sources and outlets by merging before they are closed out of the market.20 2 Moreover, the increasing foreclosure which results from the verin the
tical mergers affects not only the nonintegrated firms already
20 3
market.
the
to
entrants
prospective
the
also
but
industry,
A trend toward vertical mergers and the resulting foreclosure of
the market thus threatens the "economic way of life sought to be preserved by Congress. ' ' 204 In enforcing the Clayton Act, courts therefore
attempt to halt the trend in its incipiency, before competition is actually
and irreparably harmed. 20 5 The courts follow the legislative mandate
of the Clayton Act and protect small independent entrepreneurs and
businesses by looking disfavorably upon vertical mergers that may
cause or add to a trend which in turn forces such small independents
20 6
out of the market.
In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court recognized the threat to competition which can result from a trend of vertical mergers. The Court,
in condemning the vertical aspects of the merger before it, noted that
the merger added to the trend toward vertical integration in the shoe
industry. 20 7 The Court was concerned particularly with the foreclosure
effect which resulted from the merger trend:
[T]he [district] court found a tendency of the acquiring manufacturers to become increasingly important sources of supply for
their acquired outlets. The necessary corollary of these trends is the
foreclosure of independent manufacturers from markets otherwise
open to them.
Brown argues, however, that the shoe industry is at present composed of a large number of manufacturers and retailers, and that the
industry is dynamically competitive. But remaining vigor cannot immunize a merger if the trend in that industry is toward oligopoly. It
is the probable effect of the merger upon the future as well as the
Act commands the courts and the Compresent which the Clayton
208
mission to examine.
202. Id.
203. See notes 33-42 & accompanying text supra.
204. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 333 (1962) (footnote omitted).
205. Courts consider trends toward vertical integration as "self-perpetuating" and thus
wish to prevent them in their incipiency. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F.
Supp. 439, 447, 465 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
206. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 333 (1962).
207. Id. at 334.
208. Id. at 332-33 (citation omitted). See also Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d
1083, 1092 (8th Cir. 1972); United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 603 (6th Cir.
1970) (remaining competition in the relevant market does not overcome the anticompetitive
consequences of a trend toward integration).
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In subsequent cases, the existence of a trend of vertical mergers has
been cited as a primary 20 9 or contributing 2 10 reason for condemning a
vertical merger. Furthermore, the Justice Department, in its Merger
Guidelines, cites a trend toward vertical integration as an important
factor in evaluating vertical mergers if the trend raises entry barriers or
places nonintegrated firms at a competitive disadvantage. 21 A trend
toward vertical integration among the large firms in the industry, of
2 12
course, is particularly open to attack.
Intent

As previously noted, vertical mergers do not have inherent anticompetitive consequences but rather may be anticompetitive depending in part on how the merging firms interact with each other. This is
particularly true with respect to the foreclosure effect which, as discussed, may be either potential or actual.21 3 In determining how the
merging firms will interact after the merger, courts understandably
look at the merging firms' motives and intent behind the merger. If the
merging firms intend to deal exclusively with each other and thus fore209. See United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 102, 104, 105
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), afdper curiam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965). See also United Nuclear Corp. v.
Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539, 556-57 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (distinguishing other cases
in which there was a preexisting trend toward integration).
210. See Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1092 (8th Cir. 1972); United
States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sybron Corp.,
329 F. Supp. 919, 930 (E.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp.
439, 446-48 (N.D. Cal. 1967); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196, 226
(D.N.J. 1966). Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 279 n.6 (1964)
(reviewing vertical mergers in a primarily horizontal merger case). See also NBO Indus.
Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (holding that charge to jury must contain instructions concerning any industry trend of vertical
mergers).
211. The Justice Department Merger Guidelines provides, in part: "[T]he most common
instances in which challenge by the Department can ordinarily be anticipated are acquisitions of suppliers or customers by major firms in an industry in which (i) there has been, or
is developing, a significant trend toward vertical integration by merger such that the trend, if
unchallenged, would probably raise barriers to entry or impose a competitive disadvantage
on unintegrated or partly integrated firms, and (ii) it does not clearly appear that the particular acquisition will result in significant economies of production or distribution unrelated to
advertising or other promotional economies." MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, 14(b).
212. See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1970). Even if
the trend occurs in a different geographic market, the court may consider it an indication of
future activity in the market in question. Id. at 603; United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
264 F. Supp. 439, 461 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
213. See notes 144-47 & accompanying text supra.
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close competitors, 2 14 or if they see the merger as a means of dominating
21 5
their markets, then the courts will look disfavorably on the merger.
The Court in Brown Shoe noted the significance of the merging
firms' intent in evaluating the anticompetitive impact of a merger's vertical aspects: "A most important. . . factor to examine is the very nature and purpose of the arrangement. ' 21 6 The Court observed that,
based on the acquiring firm's past behavior and indeed its own official
statements, the acquiring firm would deal on a noncompetitive basis
with the acquired firm. In addition, the Justice Department recognizes
in its guidelines the importance of the intent behind a vertical merger
firms
and looks disfavorably upon any merger in which the merging
217
intend to foreclose competitors or dominate the market.
While evidence of the merging firms' intent can be used to demonstrate what anticompetitive consequences can be expected from the
merger, courts can condemn a merger even if improper intent by the
merging firms cannot be demonstrated. 21 8 Similarly, courts and the
Justice Department usually do not give much credence to merging
firms' statements that their motives are procompetitive as such statements generally are self-serving. 2 19 Occasionally, however, claims of
220
procompetitive intent can have merit and will be considered.
Significantly, the Clayton Act exempts acquisitions of stock made
solely for investment from section 7 evaluation. Nonetheless, acquiring
firms have had difficulty in establishing that their sole intention was
214. See Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1091, 1092 (8th Cir. 1972);
United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 599, 601 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1287 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
215. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718, 729-30 (E.D. Mo.
1964), aI'dpercuriam, 382 U.S. 12 (1965).
216. 370 U.S. at 329 (footnote omitted).
217. "[Clhallenge by the Department can ordinarily be anticipated.. . [ofl the acquisition by a firm of a customer or supplier for the purpose of increasing the difficulty of potential competitors in entering the market of either the acquiring firm or acquired firm, or for
the purpose of putting competitors of either the acquiring or acquired firm at an unwarranted disadvantage." MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, 14(b).
218. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 n.48 (1962) (noting it is "'unnecessary for the government to speculate as to what is in the "back of the minds" of those
who promote a merger' "); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
589 (1957).
219. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606, 621 (C.D. Cal.
1972). Similarly, "good intention and high purpose" are "irrelevant" in § 7 analysis. United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 615, 615 n.63 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Also,
economic benefits do not justify an anticompetitive merger. United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). See also MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, 16.
220. United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1289 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(vertical merger was defensive).
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investment. Moreover, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in United
States v. E. I du Pont de Nemours & Co.,221 the statute qualifies the
privilege by prohibiting the use of stock to harm competition. 222 In the
du Pont case, the stock acquisition was found to be illegal because the
relationship between the acquiring and acquired firms probably would
have ripened into the proscribed anticompetitive behavior at some time
in the future. 223 Claims of investment purpose also failed in a case in

which it was to the parent's advantage to capture a customer or supplier before one of the parent's competitors did so,224 and in one in
which the parent purchased 100% of the subsidiary's stock and the par225
ent-subsidiary sales increased at competitors' expense.

Barriersto Entry
An entry barrier is an economic or artificial obstacle that impedes
or blocks the entry of new firms into the market place. Entry barriers
may exist in a market for a variety of reasons. Entry into an industry
may require a large initial capital investment because equipment is expensive, substantial start-up advertising is required, economies of scale
in the industry require a large operation to be efficient, or because ini226
tial losses will be incurred before obtaining market recognition.
Technical or managerial expertise may be needed before an entrant can
attempt to enter the market.2 27 Necessary raw materials may not be
easily accessible and indeed may be totally unavailable. 228 Finally,
government regulation may inhibit or restrict entry into an industry.
221. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
222. Id. at 589.
223. Id. at 597, 607. Some commentators have questioned the Court's assumption that
the acquiring firm ever would force its goods on the acquired firm. These writers contend
that a firm will always purchase its product needs at the lowest price and will disregard its
affiliate's higher priced products. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ANTITRUST 704 (1974).
224. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 447 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
225. United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 563 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aft'd
per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196
(D.N.J. 1966) (enjoining acquisition despite the fact that the acquiring firm was primarily an
investment company).
226. See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 605 (6th Cir. 1970 ) (multimillion dollar investment); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196, 225 (D.N.J.
1966) (same).
227. Cf. Filtrol Corp. v. Slick Corp., [1970] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,035, at 88,053 (C.D.
Cal. 1969), afdper curiam, 428 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1970) (lack of knowledge as to clay
deposit locations constituted an entry barrier).
228. See Filtrol Corp. v. Slick Corp., [1970] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73,035, at 88,053 (C.D.
Cal. 1969), afdper curiam, 428 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
253 F. Supp. 196, 225 (D.N.J. 1966).
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These entry barriers may exist in any market irrespective of whether
any vertical mergers have occured in the market.
While the courts take due note of entry barriers, whatever their

cause, barriers to entry that result from vertical integration are particularly significant. Because of the competitive advantages from vertical

integration-certainty of supplies and sales outlets, increased ease in
product differentiation, reduced overhead expense, the availablility of
management expertise and capital, and other economies-entry into a
market containing a high percentage of vertically integrated firms will
be difficult for entrants not vertically integrated. 229 Of course, to be

vertically integrated entrants will need more capital than would be required to enter in a single stage of production. 230 Thus, the economic
advantages of vertical integration and the required added capital for
entry into a vertically integrated industry, as well as the psychological
fear smaller firms possess when competing against large, vertically integrated firms, 23 ' all can be significant barriers to entry resulting from
vertical integration.
If entry into the relevant market is impeded, then the market will

tend to be noncompetitive because there will be less fear that high noncompetitive prices will induce new competitors to enter into the market.
Recognizing the entry barriers, the entrenched firms are able to engage
in oligopolistic practices such as setting high prices. 232 Accordingly, the
courts have taken account of the anticompetitive consequences of barriers to entry in evaluating vertical mergers. In FordMotorCo. v. United

States,233 the Supreme Court recognized that insurmountable barriers
existed in the customer market, auto manufacturing, and that the verti229. "Market penetration by a new manufacturing entrant is difficult because of the
obstacles associated with securing retail marketing sources. Although the reasons for the
reluctance of dental dealers to take on new entrants' products are understandable, a hurdle
to entry is created. Even after recognition by the leading dealers, promotion of a new entrant's product does not necessarily follow." United States v. Sybron Corp., 329 F. Supp.
919, 929 (E.D. Pa. 1971). See also Comanor, supra note 143, at 262, noting that "the 'integration of retail dealer-service organizations by manufacturers, either through ownership or
exclusive dealing arrangements,' serves frequently as an important source of entry barriers
attributable to product differentiation. Since these barriers, where they exist, result precisely
from joining two successive stages of production, anticompetitive consequences can be attributed directly to vertical integration." Id. (footnote omitted).
230. Comanor, supra note 143, at 260.
231. United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 605 (6th Cir. 1970).
232. See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 604 (6th Cir. 1970) (new entry
barriers enhance the market power of existing firms and "intensifLy] their ability to wield
oligopolistic and anticompetitive practices with relative impunity"). See also Mississippi
River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1092 (8th Cir. 1972).
233. 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
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cal merger raised the barriers to the supplier market the spark plug
industry. 234 In United States v. Standard Oil Co.,235 the court recognized that vertically integrated firms can be so "firmly entrenched" that
possible entrants are dissuaded from even attempting to enter the market.236 In United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 2 3 7 the court cited entry
barriers as one of the major factors requiring rejection of the vertical
merger before the court. 238 Other courts also have considered barriers
to entry in evaluating vertical mergers, 239 and the Justice Department
in its Merger Guidelines recognizes the anticompetitive effect of barriers
to entry in vertical merger cases. 240 Thus, where a market already is
vertically integrated or a vertical merger would create or contribute to
vertical integration, courts tend to condemn vertical mergers. Of
course, the advantages to the merging firms from vertical integration in
some circumstances are small or nonexistent. In such cases, they do not
effect barriers to entry and thus are not considered in the evaluation of
the vertical merger.
While courts prefer concrete evidence of any actual anticompetitive effects of barriers to entry resulting from vertical integration, many
courts virtually will assume the existence of such effects from evidence
suggesting the existence of the entry barriers themselves. For example,
in United States v. Sybron Corp.,24 1 the court, in evaluating a vertical
merger, concluded that "[tlhere is little specific proof that the merger in
234. Id. at 568, 571.
235. 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966).
236. Id. at 227.
237. 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970).
238. Id. at 605.
239. GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 413
U.S. 901 (1973); United Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539, 556
(E.D. Pa. 1969).

240. "[Vjertical mergers tend to raise barriers to entry in undesirable ways, particularly
(i) by foreclosing equal access to potential customers, thus reducing the ability of nonintegrated firms to capture competitively the market share needed to achieve an efficient

level of production, or imposing the burden of entry on an integrated basis (i.e., at both the
supplying and purchasing levels) even though entry at a single level would permit efficient
operation; (ii) by foreclosing equal access to potential suppliers, thus either increasing the
risk of a price or supply squeeze on the new entrant or imposing the additional burden of
entry as an integrated firm; or (iii) by facilitating promotional product differentiation, when
the merger involves a manufacturing firm's acquisition of firms at the retail level. Besides

impeding the entry of new sellers, the foregoing consequences of vertical mergers, if present,
also artificially inhibit the expansion of presently competing sellers by conferring on the
merged firm competitive advantages, unrelated to real economies of production or distribution, over non-integrated or partly integrated firms." MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note I,
11.
241. 329 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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question has increased the barriers to entry in absolute terms. However, potential entrants will be discouraged by the prospect of competing with powerful vertically integrated companies. '242 Nonetheless,
some commentators question whether even the most sizeable vertical
mergers actually create the presumed entry barriers and resultant anticompetitive conditions, 243 while others argue that firms created by

vertical mergers are seldom large enough to create practial barriers to
entry. 244 These arguments are of practical significance because low en-

new firms to
try barriers make vertical mergers less suspect by enabling
245
enter to replace the merging supplier or customer firm.
PotentialCompetition

If either of the merging firms actually would have entered the

other merging firm's market but for the merger, ie., was an actual potential entrant, or was viewed by the members of the other merging

firm's market as a possible entrant into that market, ie., was a perceived potential entrant, then the vertical merger eliminates the
procompetive effect of that firm's status as a potential competitor. The
competitive effect of having a potential competitor on the edge of the
market is described as potential competition because the firm is threat-

ening to compete, or is perceived as such, but is not yet actually competing. While the elimination of a potential competitor is most often a
factor in conglomerate mergers, it can be a significant consideration in
246
evaluating a vertical merger as well.

If a firm outside the market is perceived as a possible threat to
242. Id. at 930.
243. See, e.g., Comanor, supra note 143, at 260 n.14. Comanor notes the view of Professor Bork, who argues that greater capital requirements placed on new firms forced to enter at
both stages are not tantamount to entry barriers "unless they are impediments in the capital
market that prevent capital from flowing to areas where it can most profitably be employed." This view is contrasted with that of Professor Bain, which is that high capital
requirements effectively impose significant entry barriers in many industries.
244. Bork, Contrastsin Antitrust Theory: I, 65 COLuM. L. REv. 363, 406 (1965).
245. Carrier Corp. v. United Technologies Corp., [19781 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,393,
at 76,376 (N.D.N.Y. 1978), a9.'d without adoptingthe opinion, [1978] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,405 (2d Cir. 1978). United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1286
(W.D. Pa. 1977). A kind of reverse entry barriers argument was made in Mississippi River
Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1972). The defendant argued that it could only enter
the market by vertical merger because the present members of the market were tied up
through contracts. The court rejected this argument.
246. The potential competition aspect of a merger technically is not a "vertical factor,"
because it does not relate to the supplier-customer dimension of a vertical merger. Rather,
such an aspect is a "conglomerate" factor. The potential competitor dimension, however,
often does occur in vertical mergers and thus is relevant to their evaluation.
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enter the market in the future, then the firms in the market will refrain
from increasing prices (and profits) to avoid enticing the fringe company to enter the market. Any merger which eliminates such a perceived potential entrant is to that extent anticompetitive.2 47 Similarly,
if a firm outside the relevant market actually might have entered the
market but for the merger, then the competition that would have been
created by its entry is eliminated, and thus the merger to that extent is
anticompetitive. 248 Competition would be better served if the firm entered the market independently and added to the vigor of competition.
The exception to this principle is a "toehold" acquisition, which is the
acquisition of a small firm in a market in which the acquiring firm is
not engaged. A toehold acquisition is encouraged because it increases
competition in the market by strengthening a small and presumably
weak competitor. The Federal Trade Commission has stated that it
will consider the acquisition of a firm with 10% or less of the market a
2 49
toehold acquisition.
If a vertical merger eliminates potential competition because the
merger involves either a perceived or an actual entrant, the courts will
consider this fact in evaluating the merger. For example, in FordMotor
Co. v. United States,250 the elimination of potential competition was
one of the factors considered in condemning the merger. 2 5' The Court
in Ford found that the merger eliminated Ford as a potential entrant
into the spark plug industry. In addition, Ford's actual entry by merger
into that market would not have deconcentrated the spark plug market
because of the original Ford equipment tie. The Court noted that
mechanics tend to replace the spark plugs with the same brand originally installed. Because a Ford spark plug would be original equipment on Ford cars and would thereby become the replacement brand, a
Ford spark plug company would only displace the existing independent
firm, Autolite. 252 Thus, deconcentration, the normal consequence of
247. See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 558-59 (1973). See
also FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173-74 (1964).
248. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129, 138 (N.D.
Cal.), aft'dpercuriam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966). The Supreme Court has twice avoided ruling on
the actual potential entrant doctrine. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S.
602, 638-39 (1974); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973).
249. Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 518, 581 (1975). But see United States v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1258 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'dmem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974) (acquisition
of firm controlling 7% of a concentrated market not a "toehold" acquisition).
250. 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
251. Id. at 566-68. See also Scott Paper Co. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1962).
252. 405 U.S. at 567-68.
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new entry, would not occur. Instead of an increase in the number of
competitors, the number of manufacturers would remain the same,
253
with a substitution of Ford for Autolite.

Ford's status as a potential competitor was procompetitive in that
Ford, from its position on the edge of the market, had a "soothing influence over replacement prices.

' 254

The Court preserved this status by

condemning the merger and by enjoining Ford from entering the spark
plug market by internal expansion for ten years and from marketing
plugs under the Ford name' for five years. 255 This also was calculated
to restore Autolite as a major independent producer. 256 The Court felt

that Autolite could withstand an independent entry by Ford ten years
the market which were expected to
hence because of forces at work in 257

weaken the original equipment tie.

In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 2 58 the acquisition by the
Standard Oil Company of the Potash Company of America was enjoined permanently because of the merger's probable anticompetitive
effects, both vertically and horizontally, 259 in the potash production

market. The acquiring firm argued that it was not a potential competitor of the acquired firm because there was no evidence that Standard
Oil's pre-merger sources of potash could be mined economically. Thus,

but for the merger, it would have explored other investment opportuni260
ties more profitable than an entry into the acquired firm's market.

The court ignored this argument and found that Standard Oil probably
would remain a potential competitor if it could not acquire a potash
producer because Standard Oil likely would continue its explorations
253. Chief Justice Burger made the same point in a separate opinion. Id. at 586-87
(Burger, C.J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
254. Id. at 567. Part of this influence was traceable to Ford's position as a major purchaser of spark plugs. Id. at 573-74.
255. Id. at 575, 577.
256. Id. at 575.
257. Id. at 575, 578. It should be noted, however, that some commentators have
criticized Ford as an attack on industry efficiency. These commentators contend that the
automotive industry structures its production and distribution schemes in a manner most
efficient for the automotive industry; it is secondary that this scheme includes the manufacturers acquiring their own suppliers. Whether to manufacture a product or purchase this
product is a determination, it is argued, that the industry will base upon exacting
cost/benefit analyses, analyses the law should allow the industry to make without interference. "The Ford-Autolite opinion... is almost certainly merely another example of efficient integration destroyed through reliance on an incorrect economic theory." R. BoRK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 237 (1978).

258.
259.
260.

253 F. Supp. 196 (D.NJ. 1966).
Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 220-21.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

and eventually enter the market when a profitable opportunity devel26
oped. 1
The elimination of a prospective entrant by merger was considered
again in United Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion Engineering,Inc.262 The
plaintiff, however, failed to carry its burden of proof on the question of
whether the acquisition by a nuclear power plant manufacturer of an
independent fuel fabricator would substantially lessen competition in
the uranium market. 263 The court concluded that the elimination of
the acquiring firm as a potential competitor was not necessarily anticompetitive. The court noted that the acquiring company had little
impact on the uranium market because it was not yet a going concern
as a fuel fabricator and because it was only one of forty-seven firms
2 64
then exploring for uranium.
The Justice Department guidelines follow the courts' position that
the elimination of potential competition must be considered in evaluating vertical mergers. 265 Thus, the elimination of potential competition,
actual or perceived, generally has been greeted with disfavor by courts
evaluating vertical mergers.
Price and Suppl Squeezes
Vertical mergers can result in supply or price squeezes on the independent competitors of the merging firms. The use of such supply
and price squeezes prevents independents from acting in a competitive
manner 266 and challenging the vertically integrated firms. Similarly,
267
supply and price squeezes raise the entry barriers in the market.
A supply squeeze can occur if the product the merging supply firm
sells is in short supply or is unique. The merging supply firm can favor
its affiliated customer firm by refusing to sell to the merging customer
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 227.
302 F. Supp. 539 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 556.
See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1, 1 14(b), noting that the Department of

Justice considers suspect acquisitions "by a firm of a customer or supplier for the purpose of
increasing the difficulty of potential competitors in entering the market of either acquiring or
acquired firm at an unwarranted disadvantage." The Merger Guidelines, in its discussion of
conglomerate mergers, explicitly addresses the problem of elimination by merger of a potential competitor. Id. $ 18.
266. For example, in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576

(S.D.N.Y. 1958), the court recognized that the threat of a supply squeeze throttles competition: "[I]f the independent sells. . . below his competitor-supplier's price... he may lose
his source of supply .... " Id. at 612.
267.

See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 605 (6th Cir. 1970).

November 1979]

VERTICAL MERGERS

firm's competitors or by supplying them only with inferior goods.268
The result is that the merging customer firm is at a competitive advantage and the independents either will have to "stay in line" or be boxed
out of the market.
Alternately, the merging supply firm arbitrarily can raise the price
of the product which is in short supply or is unique.269 The vertically
integrated firm will make the same profit from its integrated operation
because the merging supply firm should gain the profit the merging
customer firm loses. 270 The profits of the merging customer firm's competitors, however, will be reduced because of the higher costs of their
raw materials. 271 This price squeeze may force the independents out of
272
the merging customer firm's market.
The same type of price and supply squeeze can affect the competitors of the merging supply firm if the merging customer firm purchases
a product which few firms purchase or of which there is an oversupply. 273 The merging customer firm may choose to purchase the oversupplied product exclusively from its affiliated supply firm, thus
causing a "purchase squeeze" among competitors. 274 Alternately, it
can lower its purchase price, thus causing a price squeeze. 275 Such
products, however, are unusual and thus a price or supply squeeze is
more likely in the merging customer firm's market than in the merging
supplier firm's market.
268. See Filtrol Corp. v. Slick Corp., [1970] Trade Cas. (CCH) 173,035, at 88,053 (C.D.
Cal. 1969), a1 7dper curiam, 428 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1970).
269. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
(evidence established a price squeeze). Cf. Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 663 n.8 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963) (court dismissed the one instance of underbidding as an isolated incident in a monopoly conspiracy
case). Price squeezes also can occur naturally from market conditions. See United States v.
Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), adpercuriam, 381 U.S.
414 (1965).
270. Of course, to the extent the integrated firm loses sales to independent customer
firms, its profits are decreased. However, the competitive advantage the merging customer
firm gains may outweigh the lost profits. See note 276 infra.
271. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 612-13 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
272. On a similar ground, courts look with disfavor on mergers which eliminate a strong
competitor or an independent that was a driving force in the market, leaving only weak
uncompetitive firms. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562,568,570 (1972); United
States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 97, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), afd er
curiam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965). Mergers which introduce an oligopolist into a competitive
market are frowned upon for similar reasons. See note 40 & accompanying text supra.
273. United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 104 (S.D.N.Y 1964).
274. Id.
275. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 612-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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The Justice Department, in its Merger Guidelines, recognizes the
276
potential problems that can be caused by price and supply squeezes.
Moreover, the courts and commentators have recognized the anticompetitive consequences from price and supply squeezes. 277 For example,
one commentator described the price squeeze in the aluminum industry
before World War II as follows:
The classic example of a price squeeze occurred in the aluminum industry during the period when Alcoa enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the production of the basic metal. To realize the gains
from a discriminatory pricing structure, Alcoa found it profitable to
set a relatively high price for aluminum ingot and a relatively low
one for rolled aluminum sheet. The degree of discrimination was
sufficiently great, moreover, so that for a number of years during the
1920's, the ingot-sheet price differential fell below the full cost of
rolling sheet.
The impact of this pricing structure on independent aluminum
fabricators was clear. They were placed at the mercy of Alcoa, from
whom they were forced to purchase the basic metal, and Alcoa held
the power to extend its market position into the fabricating industries. Moreover, even if Alcoa's underlying intent was not to extend
its monopoly position, the price 27squeeze
was the natural result of a
8
discriminatory pricing structure.

One must remember, however, that although a price or supply squeeze
may be possible, it need not always occur. The vertically integrated
firm may conclude that in the long run its dealings with independents
are profitable and therefore it should exercise self-restraint. 279 One
commentator even contends that a vertically integrated firm will never
cause a price or supply squeeze because it will want to maximize profits
276. "If the product sold by the supplying firm and its competitors is either a complex
one ... or is a scarce raw material or other product ... the merged firm may have the
power to use any temporary superiority, or any shortage, in the product of the supplying
firm to put competitors of the purchasing firm at a disadvantage by refusing to sell the
product to them (supply squeeze) or by narrowing the margin between the price at which it
sells the product to the purchasing firm's competitors and the price at which the end-product
is sold by the purchasing firm (price squeeze) ....
[T]he increase in barriers to entry in the
purchasing firm's market arising simply from the increased risk of a possible squeeze is
sufficient to warrant prohibition of any merger between a supplier possessing significant
market power and a substantial purchaser of any product meeting the above description."
MERGER GUIDELINES,

supra note 1, $ 13.

277. See, e.g., United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 104 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Comanor, supra note 143, at 255.
278. Comanor, supra note 143, at 255 (footnote omitted).
279. Courts recognize that it is not always the best business practice to squeeze competitors. See, e.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 355 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd per curiam, 381 U.S.
414 (1965) (noting discrimination against competitors during shortage would have had negative effect in times of greater supply).
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at every level of production. 280 Some courts nonetheless consider even
the potential for price and supply squeezes anticompetitive because the
possibility alone deters competition, albeit less than actual price and

supply squeezes. 281
Deep Pocket Effect

The "deep pocket effect" refers to the advantage a firm with strong
financial backing has over other, poorer firms. A rich firm can drive
other firms out of the market by lowering prices and sustaining tempo-

rary losses. It can afford to purchase new equipment or techonology
from which it can derive efficiencies which will give it an advantage
over competitors. It can secure credit more easily and on better terms
than its less stable competitors. Moreover, the mere existence of a com-

petitor with a deep pocket can have "adverse psychological effects" on
other firms. 2 82 If a merger unites a rich, deep pocket firm with a smal-

ler firm that normally competes against other smaller firms, then the
influx of capital from the larger merging firm to the smaller merging
firm can give the smaller firm a competitive advantage over its small
competitors.
Competition in a market where other firms do not have equivalent

financial support thus can be affected severely by the introduction of a
"deep pocket" or "rich parent," 283 who is able to transfer large amounts
of capital to its smaller affiliate. In effect, the rich parent can use its
funds to insulate the subsidiary from competitors:
In essence, the rationale behind the deep pocket theory is that the
company with a deep pocket from which to withdraw substantial
financial or other backing is given a superior competitive advantage
of commerce are without
when the competitors in the relevant line
2 84
the support of their own deep pockets.

The subsidiary's competitors will not be able to match the subsidiary's
280. Bork, Contrastsin Antitrust Theory: I, 65 COLUM. L. Rav. 363, 405 (1965).
281. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 461 (N.D. Cal. 1967)
(price squeeze possible); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718, 728
(E.D. Mo. 1964), af'dper curlam, 382 U.S. 12 (1965) (price squeeze possible); United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (supply squeeze possible).
282. United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 604 (6th Cir. 1970). There is,
however, a certain amount of skepticism among some commentators on whether the large
"risk takers" of the industrial world can be intimidated "by barriers that academicians perceive to be merely 'psychological."' Bork, Contrastsin Antitrust Theory. I, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 363, 406 (1965).
283. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
284. Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 315, 318 (N.D. Ill.
1965). The deep pocket concept is also known as the "wealth" theory. Id. at 318 n.4.
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prices for long if the parent decides to operate its subsidiary at a loss. 285
Nor will competitors be able to match the subsidiary's capital improvements because only the subsidiary can secure credit directly from the
parent 286 or easily obtain outside debt financing on the strength of the
28 7
parent's good name.
The courts consider these anticompetive effects in evaluating all
types of mergers, 288 including vertical mergers. The courts look disfavorably upon vertical mergers in which one of the firms, usually the
acquiring firm, is an economic giant compared to the other firm and its
competitors. The significance of the deep pocket effect in vertical
merger cases, however, has varied depending upon the circumstances
surrounding the merger. In some cases, where other factors have dominated, the courts merely have mentioned the deep pocket effect in passing 289 or have viewed it in combination with other factors. 290 Other
courts, however, have strongly supported the theory behind the deep
pocket effect and have condemned a vertical merger primarily because
of the merger's deep pocket effect.
The first vertical merger case in which the deep pocket theory was
the primary rationale behind condemning the merger was Reynolds
Metals Co. v. FTC.2 91 In that case, the world's largest aluminum foil
producer acquired a florist foil converter that controlled a third of the
285. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718, 727-28 (E.D. Mo. 1964), affidper
curiam, 382 U.S. 12 (1965).
286. See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 604 (6th Cir. 1970).
287. "[Tlhe cost of capital tends to fall for larger firms as their credit rating rises, their
securities assume blue-chip status, and internally generated funds accumulate. Large firms
often are able to borrow at interest rates 1 to 3 percentage points below small- and mediumsized firms." ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM, supra note 12, at 296. For a judicial recognition of
the deep pocket parent's ability to obtain more favorable credit terms, see NBO Indus.
Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). Rich parents
also can help the ultimate consumers secure loans with which to purchase goods from the
subsidiary, thereby obligating the consumer to the parent. See United States v. KimberlyClark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 446 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
288. The deep pocket effect is more important in evaluating conglomerate mergers than
horizontal and vertical mergers. The difference in significance is attributable to the lack of
any overriding factors in judging conglomerate mergers whereas the consideration of horizontal mergers is dominated by the elimination of a competitor and vertical merger by the
foreclosure effect.
289. See United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 461 (N.D. Cal.
1967); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196, 205 (D.N.J. 1966).
290. See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 603-04 (6th Cir. 1970).
291. 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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florist foil market. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that this acquisition gave the acquired firm
an immediate advantage over its competitors who were contending
for a share of the market for florist foil. The power of the "deep
pocket" or "rich parent" for one of the florist foil suppliers in a competitive group where previously no company was very large and all
were relatively small opened the possibility and power to sell at
below and thus to undercut and ravage
prices approximating cost or 292
the less affluent competition.
The court characterized the foreclosure of Reynold's competitors from
thirty-three percent of the floral foil conversion industry as a "minor
anticompetitive effect" and described the93 deep pocket as giving the
2
"truer picture of anticompetitive effect.
The significance of the deep pocket effect has been questioned by
295
294
some courts since Reynolds, but most have embraced the theory.
Moreover, the Supreme Court indicated its approval of the theory
when, upon remanding a merger case, it stated that "[i]f the acquisitions here were unlawful, it is because they brought a 'deep pocket'
parent into a market of 'pygmies.' "296 Of course, the introduction of a
deep pocket parent into a market is not per se illegal. The injection of
such a parent into a market of smaller firms is condemned only it if
may result in substantial anticompetitive effects. 297 For example,
showing that other firms in the market already are controlled by economic giants undercuts the implication that the vertical merger of298a
firm with a deep pocket parent may substantially lessen competition.
Absent such circumstances, however, courts will closely scrutinize
mergers injecting wealthy firms into new markets.
HorizontalDimension of Merger
Often a merger is examined in light of both horizontal and vertical
factors. The cases in which this occurs can be grouped into two broad
292. Id. at 229-30.
293. Id. at 229.
294. See, e.g., Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 315, 319
1965).
(N.D. Ill.
295. See, e.g., NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262,268-70 (3d
Cir. 1975), vacatedand remandedsub nom. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S. 477 (1977).
296. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487 (1977).
297. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1962), indicating
deep pocket acquisition might be necessary under appropriate circumstances to preserve
competition.
298. Cf. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d Cir.),
motion to vacate stay granted,418 U.S. 919 (1974) (conglomerate merger case).
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categories: mergers that are both horizontal and vertical because they
unite a vertically integrated firm with another firm having at least one
stage of production in common with the integrated firm; and vertical
mergers in industries that are concentrated horizontally or are exhibiting a trend toward horizontal concentration.
A merger that is both horizontal and vertical in nature can violate
section 7 in several ways. Either aspect alone of course can be sufficient
to support a finding of illegality. 299 A merger is not immunized because it survives section 7 scrutiny in one aspect if the other aspect
makes it unlawful. Moreover, the merger can run afoul of section 7 in
both dimensions. 300 The more difficult question is whether illegality
can be based on both aspects viewed in conjunction if neither aspect
standing alone would justify such a finding of probable anticompetitive
effect. The question has not been answered by the Supreme Court nor
with any precision by lower courts. One lower court has stated, however, that vertical aspects "taken with all the other evidence in the case"
supported a finding of illegality. 30' Although the horizontal aspect was
predominant, the court held the merger violative of section 7 on the
basis of the entire record. 30 2 Even though this court appeared to decide
the case on a combined analysis of both the horizontal and vertical
aspects of the merger, 30 3 no court yet has recognized explicitly a doctrine of cumulative illegality.
In cases in which the merger itself is only vertical in nature, courts
sometimes mention in passing the horizontal concentration or the trend
toward horizontal concentration in the relevant markets. 3 °n At other
times, however, these elements are elevated to the status of a separate
factor to be considered along with the other factors, such as foreclosure,
that usually are examined in vertical merger cases. 30 5 Courts in these
cases often determine how the horizontal and vertical factors are interrelated rather than attempting to evaluate each set of factors in isola299.

See United Nuclear Corp. v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539, 565 (E.D.

Pa. 1969) (court considered both horizontal and vertical aspects of mergers).
300. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Horizontal and vertical violations were also found in United States v. Kennecott Copper
Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 101-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), afdper curiam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965).
301. A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 624 (3d Cir. 1962).
302. Id. at 629.
303. Id. at 617.
304. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196, 208, 224-25 (D.N.J.

1966).
305. Horizontal considerations are listed as one of six factors normally examined in vertical merger cases in United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1970), and
in Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1091 (8th Cir. 1972).
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tion. For example, courts are aware that horizontal concentration
amplifies the anticompetitive consequences of the vertical factors. In
such cases the foreclosure effect is certain to be substantial if the merg3
ing firms are oligopolists. 06
Vertical integration likewise aggravates the anticompetitive consequences of the horizontal factors. Horizontal concentration can be increased if a firm vertically integrates and, by virtue of its newly found
efficiency, becomes a leading firm. Horizontal concentration also can
be increased at an adjoining stage if oligopolists merge with suppliers
or outlets and foreclose them. The once-atomized structure of the adjoining stage will soon mirror the configuration of the oligopolists' market.
Horizontal concentration gives leading firms market power, the exercise of which is tempered by the threat that firms at the adjoining
stage will become competitors by vertical integration. If the firms at
the adjoining stage integrate by merger, this restraining influence is
lost, even though the number of firms in the acquired firms' market
remains unchanged. In addition, if firms at the adjoining stage had
integrated by internal expansion rather than by merger, then the
number of firms in the acquired firms' market would have increased by
one instead of remaining the same. Moreover, the effects of horizontal
concentration are worsened by a vertical merger. The acquired firm is
lost as a perceived entrant and as a restraint on the exercise of market
power.30 7 The market structure which could have been deconcentrated
had the acquiring firms achieved vertical integration by internal expansion instead of by merger, is unaltered.
Under conditions of horizontal concentration and vertical integration an industry will become less and less competitive. Nonintegrated
firms become less aggressive or withdraw because they fear the integrated leading firms. Entry barriers are stiffened for the same reason.308 Vertical integration in a horizontally-concentrated industry
30 9
may provide the impetus for the destruction of marginal competitors.
Competition is harmed when firms drop out and prospective entrants
refuse to take their place. At some point, integrated oligopolists will be
310
able to exercise considerable market power in one stage or another.
306. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 596 (1957).
307. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 574 (1972).
308. See United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 605 (6th Cir. 1970).
309. See United States v. Standard Ol Co., 253 F. Supp. 196, 212 (D.N.J. 1966).
310. For example, dominant, integrated copper firms were able to achieve high profits at
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Defenses
Some mergers are lawful under section 7 even though an initial
analysis reveals that the merging firms and relevant markets are of such
a size that the merger might substantially lessen competition. Courts
recognize that there may be mitigating factors, such as business failure
or inadequate resources of one of the parties, that may have prevented
one of the merging firms from maintaining its competitive position.
Such mitigating factors have resulted in certain defenses to the claim
that a merger is anticompetitive. The principal defenses are the failing
company defense, the depleted resources defense, and the countervailing power defense.
Failingor Faltering Company

If one of the merging firms would fail but for the merger, then the
merger will be allowed under section 7 of the Clayton Act, provided the
acquiring firm is the only available purchaser. 3 1' The rationale underlying the creation of this defense is "the notion that if one of the merging companies is bound to fail, then competition cannot be
substantially harmed when that company is acquired by" the only
available purchaser. 31 2 The Supreme Court has described the defense
as a choice between two evils in which "the possible threat to competition resulting from an acquisition is deemed preferable to the adverse
impact on competition and other losses if the company goes out of
3 13
business.,
In 1969, the Supreme Court outlined the dimensions of the failing
company defense in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States.3 14 The
Court determined that the failing company defense could be applied
the fabricating stage despite their inability to control refined copper prices. Comanor, supra
note 143, at 263-64.
311. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962); International Shoe Co.
v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 301 (1930). The failing company defense is also applicable when the
acquiring firm is the failing company. United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 97-98
(D. Colo. 1975).
312. United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 95 (D. Colo. 1975). But see United
States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970), in which the FTC argued that the
failing company defense is inapplicable if the marketplace would be better off with the elimination of the failing firm rather than the creation of a large integrated firm. Id. at 606-07.
The court did not reach this argument because it found that the merging firm was not failing. Id. at 607-09.
313. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974). For a recent
discussion of the failing company defense see Blum, Failing Company Doctrine, 16 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 75 (1974).
314. 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
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only if the failing company "'faced the grave possibility of a business

failure'" and the acquiring firm was the only available purchaser of the
failing company. 3 15 Furthermore, the Court stated that the prospects

for recovery of the failing firm through reorganization must be "dim or
nonexistent." 3 16 The Court seemed to be of the view that the possibility
of reorganization negated the assertion of a grave possibility of business failure. 3 17 Finally, the Court concluded that the burden of proving
the conditions necessary for invoking the failing company defense is on
3 18
the defendant.

The standards for showing a grave possibility of business failure
are strict. For instance, courts have held that dissatisfaction with a low
level of profits, 319 a need for modernization and expansion, 320 and poor
management 321 are problems that do not warrant a finding that the
company is failing. If the failing company defense is applicable, however, it will save an otherwise unlawful merger.
Depleted NaturalResources
The depleted natural resources defense is similar to the failing
company defense, and in early cases the Supreme Court considered the
two defenses in the same discussion.3 22 Later, in United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,323 the Court distinguished between the two de315. Id. at 137 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930)).
316. Id. at 138.
317. Id. Cf.United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 96-98 (D. Colo. 1975) (interpreting Citizen Publishingas requiring proof that the failing company is unable to reorganize). The proper reading of Citizen Publishing,however, seems to be that the requirement of
dim or nonexistent prospects of reorganization is merely part of the grave possibility of
business failure prerequisite. In United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549
(1971), decided after Citizen, the Court considered the failing company defense without
mentioning the necessity of proving that the prospects of reorganization are dim or nonexistent: "[The failing company] test is met only if two requirements are satisfied: (1) that the
resources of International were 'so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that
it faced the grave probability of a business failure. . . ' and (2) that there was no other
prospective purchaser for it." Id. at 555 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S.
292, 302 (1930)) (citations omitted).
318. 394 U.S. at 138-39. For example, in Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1972), the court rejected the defense on the grounds that
the acquired firm had not shown that other purchasers were not available. Id. at 622-23.
319. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606, 622 (C.D. Cal.
1972).
320. United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971).
321. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 937 (1962).
322. See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 661 (1964); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962).
323. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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fenses, elaborating on the operation of the depleted resources defense.
The Court in GeneralDynamics recognized two rationales for the failing company defense. First, because the firm would be eliminated even
without the merger, there is no lessening of competition.3 24 Second,
even if competition is reduced, the merger is permitted as the lesser of
two evils. 325 Although the merger may be anticompetitive, it saves the
acquired firm from going out of business. The Court, on the other
hand, based the depleted resources defense on only the first rationale:
if the acquired company's natural resources are depleted, then it is not
a competitive factor in the market. The Court concluded that the elimination of a firm with depleted resources from the market through a
merger is not anticompetitive. 326 The Court further noted that because
the depleted resources defense is different from the failing company
defense, it can be invoked even though the technical requirements for
327
the failing company defense have not been met.
Although the Court left open the question of whether the depleted
resources defense or the failing company defense is more difficult to
establish, the standard for establishing the depleted resources defense
nonetheless is strict. For example, in UnitedStates v. Amax, Inc.,328 the
district court rejected a depleted resources defense because it found
that the claim of unavailability of the resource (high-grade blister for
copper refining) was false.329 Even if the claim had been true, the
Court went on to find, the remaining resources of the company were
330
such that the firm's existing market share was too large.
CountervailingPower
Firms sometimes merge to protect themselves against larger companies. Although the Supreme Court has yet to uphold a vertical
merger because it enables two small companies to compete more effectively with larger integrated corporations dominating the relevant markets, 33 1 the Court in dicta has stated that this would be a viable defense:
Congress foresaw that the merger of two large companies or a large
and a small company might violate the Clayton Act while the merger
of two small companies might not, although the share of the market
324.
325.
326.
327.

Id. at 507.
Id.
Id. at 507-08.
Id.

328.
329.
330.
331.

402 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1975).
Id. at 970-73.
Id. at 970-72.
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
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foreclosed be identical, if the purpose of the small companies is to
to compete with larger corporations
enable them in combination
33 2
dominating the market.

In practice, however, establishing the defense by demonstrating that
comthe merger involves merely small companies which must merge to333
impossible.
not
if
difficult,
is
firms
integrated
large,
pete against
Economic Benefts Are Not a Defense
As noted previously, a merger may result in certain economic benefits, such as lower costs from economies of integration. Defendants
often will attempt to justify a merger on the basis of these economies.
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected any such argument. For
example, in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,334 the
Supreme Court concluded that
a merger the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen competition" is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or
economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial. A value
choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial
competence, and in any event has been made for us already, by Congress when it enacted the amended § 7. Congress determined to preserve our traditionally competitive economy. It therefore proscribed
anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant alike, fully
335
aware, we must assume, that some price might have to be paid.

The Court rejected any economic benefits defense because Congress, in
enacting section 7, chose to protect "viable, small, locally owned busiresult from
nesses," even if "occasional higher costs and prices might
'336
markets.
and
industries
the maintenance of fragmented

Summary
A vertical merger combines two firms that operate in successive
332. Id. at 331 (footnote omitted). Contra,United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270, 277 (1966) (defense found inapplicable); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 370-71 (1963) (same).
333. See, e.g., Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1088-89 (8th Cir. 1972).
334. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
335. Id. at 371.
336. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). In other cases, the
courts have rejected the economic benefits defense for similar reasons. Ford Motor Co. v.
United States, 405 U.S. 562, 578 n. 12 (1972) (effects on independents and value of atomized
markets); Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1092 (8th Cir. 1972) (effect on
local business); United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 460, 461 (N.D.
Cal. 1967) (effect on independents and small businesses); United States v. Kennecott Copper
Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), af'dper curiam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965) (value of
small, locally owned businesses); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576,
613 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (value of small businesses).
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stages of the production/distribution chain. The possible foreclosure of
competitors from the purchases and sales between the merging firms
creates the potential for vertical mergers, like horizontal and conglomerate mergers, to have anticompetitive consequences. The primary
weapon for challenging vertical mergers is section 7 of the Clayton Act.
In evaluating vertical mergers under section 7, courts look initially to
the market shares of the merging customer firm and merging supplier
firm which may be foreclosed to competitors. There is not, however,
any magic market share which is per se illegal or even prima facie evidence of illegality. Rather, other circumstances surrounding the
merger must be considered.
The courts will examine the relevant industries to determine
whether a trend toward vertical integration exists. If such a trend exists, the courts will look with disfavor on any vertical merger which
adds to the trend. Similarly, if the merging firms intended the merger
to result in the foreclosure of their competitors, the merger will not be
looked upon in a favorable light. In addition, if there are high barriers
to entry into one of the relevant markets or if the merger will increase
the barriers to entry, then the courts will tend to disapprove of the
merger.
The courts also will consider whether the merger eliminates one of
the merging firms as a potential entrant into the other merging firms'
market. Vertical mergers also provide the possibility for price and supply squeezes against independents which the courts wish to protect.
The vertical merger may create a giant firm with a "deep pocket"
which creates a disadvantage for smaller firms in the industry. Finally,
a vertical merger may have horizontal dimensions which must be considered in evaluating it.
The courts will consider all of the above factors in determining
whether the overall effect of the merger may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly. Despite a finding of such an
effect, certain mitigating factors may prove to be a defense to the claim
that the merger is anticompetitive.

